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Lawyering has changed. We no longer just advise and represent clients in
courts and administrative agencies; we design justice. For centuries,
institutions and systems for delivering justice simply evolved. Social,
cultural, and historical context shaped them incrementally; they changed
almost imperceptibly. There are examples we recognize in the western
tradition as turning points.1 Aeschylus describes the emergence of a judicial
system in the Oresteia.2 We teach students the history of the common law
with reference to the King's Court.3 The drafters of the U.S. Constitution
engaged in deliberative, knowing, and intentional institutional design of a
democracy. 4 New Deal innovators engendered a national debate on the role
of administrative agencies in creating, implementing, and enforcing public
policy. 5 The historical trend is toward a conscious and analytic, even a
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Stephanie Smith, and Tina Nabatchi. I am also grateful for the time I spent at the Center
for the Study of Law and Society at the University of California Berkeley and many
wonderful conversations with colleagues there while I was working on the manuscript.
I A review of the breakthroughs in the world's history of governance is beyond the
scope of this, or perhaps any, article.
2 AESCHyLUS, ORESTEIA: AGAMEMNON, THE LIBATION BEARERS, THE EUMENIDES,
(David Grene ed., Richmond Lattimore ed., trans., The University of Chicago Press
1953).
3 See generally THEODORE F. T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON
LAW (The Lawbook Exchange, Ltd. 2001) (1956).
4 See generally ALEXANDER HAMILTON, ET AL., THE FEDERALIST PAPERS.
5 Richard Stewart describes the evolution of administrative law in five stages. First,
the United States took from England the common law model in which citizens brought
tort actions against regulatory officials to seek judicial review of their actions. With
industrialization in the late nineteenth century and the first commissions and regulatory
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scientific approach6 to designing systems to manage conflict among citizens,
stakeholders, interest groups, and public, private, and non-profit
organizations.
A conflict, issue, dispute, or case submitted to any institution for
managing conflict, including one labeled alternative or appropriate dispute
resolution (ADR), exists in the context of a system of rules, processes, steps,
and forums. In the field of ADR, this is called'dispute system design (DSD).
In its initial usage, DSD was applied to systems for managing ripe conflicts;
such as grievances that ordinarily would be submitted to the quasi-judicial
forum of labor arbitration. 7 However, the concept has grown in scope. For
example, the civil and criminal justice systems represent DSDs created by a
government within a constitutional framework. In the context of a single
national government, DSD in ADR exists in the shadow of these traditional
justice systems.8 DSD encompasses the creation of systems for processing
many similar claims in court,9 as in mass torts.10 It also encompasses the
creation of systems within administrative agencies for handling both their
own internal conflict and for carrying out their public mission to create,
implement, and enforce public policy."1
DSD is a lens through which to examine not only domestic justice
systems, but also emerging global ones. In the absence of an authoritative
agencies, this yielded to the "traditional model of administrative law," in which courts
required agencies to use adjudication modeled on courtroom process before ratemaking
or other action; the courts then engaged in judicial review of the agency's fact-finding
based on the record and its statutory authority. During the New Deal, Congress created
agencies with open-ended statutory delegations of discretionary power, raising
constitutional concerns about their accountability. In response to the perceived
democracy deficit, James Landis advocated regulatory management by experts "guided
by experience and professional discipline." This vision helped shape the Administrative
Procedure Act, enacted in 1946. Richard B. Stewart, Essay, Administrative Law in the
Twenty-First Century, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 437,439-41 (2003).
6 Id. at 441-42.
7 See WILLIAM L. URY, ET AL., GETTING DIsPuTEs RESOLVED: DESIGNING SYSTEMS
To CUT THE COST OF CONFLICT (1988).
8 Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, "Most Cases Settle": Judicial Promotion and
Regulation of Settlements, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1339, 1349-50 (1994).
9 See, e.g., Francis E. McGovern, The What and Why of Claims Resolution
Facilities, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1361 (2005).
10 See, e.g., Deborah R. Hensler, Has the Fat Lady Sung? The Future of Mass Toxic
Torts, 26 REV. LITIG. 883 (2007).
11 See generally Lisa Blomgren Bingham, et al., The New Governance: Practices
and Processes for Stakeholder and Citizen Participation in the Work of Government, 65
PuB. ADMIN. REV. 547 (2005).
[Vol. 24:1 20081
SYSTEMS FOR MANAGING CONFLICT
global sovereign, all dispute resolution for conflict that crosses national
borders depends upon consent; either of nation-states through treaties or
disputants through contracts. Treaties incorporate conciliation, mediation, or
arbitration for disputes, sometimes through new international courts.
12
Moreover, entities such as the European Union (EU) are fostering the
creation of private dispute resolution infrastructure for perceived competitive
advantage. 13 The World Bank 14 and USAID 15 are pressing for private dispute
resolution systems as an element of basic legal infrastructure for the rule of
law.
Just as we have moved to control natural selection by using genetic
engineering to create new life forms, so too we have moved to control the
evolution of institutions and dispute systems through conscious design. 16 The
fields of institutional design and dispute system design both encompass the
human activity of creating new rules, organizations, institutions, and forums
to serve various goals related to public policy. However, through these
systems, we are also designing justice. The question is, which kind of
justice?
My purpose with this essay is to raise, not to answer, this question. First,
I briefly introduce the field of institutional analysis and design in social
science. Second, I describe the field of DSD and apply elements of
institutional analysis. Third, I survey how scholars have discussed varieties
of justice in relation to legal institutions and other systems for managing
conflict. The organizers of this symposium asked us to look toward the next
generation of DSD. I conclude that the most significant issues for the future
are: we must become more mindful of how designing institutions and
systems to manage conflict affects justice; we should move more knowingly
12 See, e.g., International Court of Justice, http://www.icj-cij.org (last visited Feb. 7,
2009). See also World Trade Organization, Understanding the WTO: Settling Disputes-
A Unique Contribution, http://www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/whatis-e/tif e/displ-e.htm
(last visited Feb. 7, 2009).
13 See Promotion of International Commercial Arbitration and Other Alternative
Dispute Resolution Techniques in the Mediterranean Region, http://www.adrmeda.org
(last visited Feb. 7, 2009).
14 See The World Bank, Law and Justice Institutions, http://go.worldbank.org/
QYSE23ZI50 (last visited Feb. 7, 2009).
1 5 See generally USAID CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY AND GOVERNANCE,
ALTERNATIVE DIsPUTE RESOLUTION PRAcTmONERs' GUIDE (1998), available at
http://www.usaid.gov/our-work/democracyand-governance/publications/
pdfs/pnacb895.pdf.
16 Most of our design interventions occur on institutions that already exist and
represent innovations or efforts to improve what is. However, in the field of DSD, there
are cases where lawyers find themselves designing claims procedures from scratch.
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and intentionally to assess justice in DSD; and we owe it to the next
generation of lawyers to teach them how to serve ethically in their new role
as designers of justice.
I. INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN
Elinor Ostrom builds on earlier work17 to explore and explain the wide
diversity of institutions that humans use to govern their behavior. 18 Examples
of this diversity include "regularized social interactions in markets,
hierarchies, families, sports, legislatures, elections,"'19 and others. DSDs
create institutions for resolving conflict.20 These resulting conflict resolution
institutions too are amenable to institutional analysis.
Institutions arise, operate, evolve, and change. Ostrom attempts to
identify an underlying set of universal building blocks and to lay out a
method for researching institutions and how they function. She argues that
these universal building blocks are arranged in layers that one can analyze
using the Institutional Analysis and Development framework. 21 Most often,
17 See generally ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE CoMMONs: THE EVOLUTION OF
INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION (1990).
18 See generally ELINOR OSTROM, UNDERSTANDING INSTITUTIONAL DIVERSITY
(2005). The study of institutional design is the subject of literature in political science,
economics, sociology, public affairs, and policy analysis.
19Id. at5.
20 Kenneth M. Ehrenberg, Procedural Justice and Information in Conflict-Resolving
Institutions, 67 ALB. L. REV. 167, 175 (2003).
People generally turn to institutions to solve these kinds of conflicts.
Sometimes the institutions are formal, as in the cases of the legal regime and
orchestra mentioned above. Other times the institutions are informal as in the case of
noncodified, but explicit, norms by which a farming neighborhood might solve
cattle-grazing disputes. Formal or informal, however, the explicitness with which
the institution is implemented for the purpose of settling the kind of dispute arising
within the particular institution's context is what distinguishes these institutions from
other frameworks in that wider context or enterprise.
Id. (citation omitted).
21 OSTROM, supra note 18, at 6. Ostrom defines a framework as the level of analysis
necessary to identify the elements and relationships among those elements necessary to
engage in institutional analysis, and which provides the most general set of variables that
therefore should apply to all settings and institutions. Id. at 28. Within the framework is
nested the concept of theory in social science. She lists a wide variety of theories that
have framed research and policy analysis on institutions: microeconomic, game,
transaction cost, social choice, public choice, constitutional, and covenant theories, as
well as theories of public goods and common pool resources. Id. Several of these theories
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this framework will help researchers focus on the simplest unit of analysis-
the action situation.22 Researchers analyze the situation, decide what
assumptions to make about participants, predict outcomes, and test the
predictions empirically.23
However, if the data does not support the predictions, it may be
necessary to examine the deeper layers within which the action situation is
embedded. For example, structures are nested; families, firms, communities,
industries, states, nations, transnational alliances, and others are all structures
that can be viewed in isolation or as part of a larger whole. 24 Thus, Ostom
borrows from complex adaptive systems literature the concept of the holons:
"nested subassemblies of part-whole units. ''25 To apply this concept to DSD,
one might consider a court-connected mediation program as a holon nested
within the structure of the court, which is nested in the judicial branch, which
in turn is nested within the structure of the state or federal government.
To analyze an action situation, Ostrom uses seven categories of
information:
(1) the set of participants [single individuals or corporate actors], (2) the
positions to be filled by participants, (3) the potential outcomes, (4) the set
of allowable actions and the function that maps actions into realized
outcomes [action-outcome linkages], (5) the control that an individual has
in regards to this function, (6) the information available to participants
about actions and outcomes and their linkages, and (7) the costs and
benefits-which serve as incentives and deterrents-assigned to actions and
outcomes.
26
have emerged in legal scholarship about disputing and dispute systems. My all time
favorite is Marc Galanter's use of game theory and transaction cost theory. See generally
Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal
Change, 9 LAw & Soc'Y REv. 95 (1974) (examining the strategic advantages of repeat
players in the civil justice system). Within the concept of theory is nested a specific
model with hypotheses predicting what a particular action arena will produce as
outcomes given its structure.
22 Ostrom focuses on two holons in the action arena, which is defined as at unit of
analysis in which participants (first holon) and the action situation (second holon) interact
in ways affected by other outside variables and produce outcomes. OSTROM, supra note
18, at 13.
2 3 Id. at 7.
24 Id. at 11.
25 Id.
26Id. at 32; see generally Chapter 2, at 32-68. Ostrom explains how to
operationalize these concepts using game theory to structure experiments in a laboratory
in Chapter 3, at 69-98.
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These are the common structural components that represent the building
blocks for all institutions at their most general level. One can readily see how
we might use these categories of information to understand DSD. For
example, a mediation design affords more control over the outcome of the
function of dispute resolution than an arbitration design. On the other hand,
limited discovery in a DSD might afford'participants significantly less
information about actions and outcomes and their linkages.
Once a researcher understands the initial action arena, she will often
"zoom out"'27 to understand the outside variables that are affecting it; this is a
two-stage process. First, the action arena now becomes a dependent variable
subject to factors in three categories of variables: "(1) the rules used by
participants to order their relationships, (2) the attributes of the biophysical
world that are acted upon in these arenas, and (3) the structure of the more
general community within which any particular arena is placed. '' 28 In the
second stage of the analysis, the researcher will examine linkages between
one action arena and others; either in sequence or at the same time. 29 For
example, in DSD, parties in mediation negotiate in the shadow of the civil
justice system. The trial is an action arena that follows in sequence upon a
failed civil or commercial mediation.
As lawyers, we tend to focus more on the rules than on the other two
categories of variables.30 Ostrom's discussion of rules is central to
understanding DSD. She defines rules for the purpose of Institutional
Analysis and Development as "shared understandings by participants about
27 Id. at 15.
28 OSTROM, supra note 18, at 15. Ostrom explains how different disciplines within
social science might cause a researcher to focus on one or another cluster of these
variables:
Anthropologists and sociologists tend to be more interested in how shared or
divisive value systems in a community affect the ways humans organize their
relationships with one another. Environmentalists tend to focus on various ways that
physical and biological systems interact and create opportunities or constraints on
the situations human beings face. Political scientists tend to focus on how specific
combinations of rules affect incentives. Rules, the biophysical and material world,
and the nature of the community all jointly affect the types of actions that
individuals can take, the benefits and costs of these actions and potential outcomes,
and the likely outcomes achieved.
Id. at 16. Lawyers also focus on the rules, but for the strategic purpose of advancing the
interests of their clients as agents of participants in the action arena of the arbitration,
administrative agency, court, or other forum.
2 9 Id. at 15.
30 Ostrom also reports that her book focuses primarily on rules, which are of central
interest to political science and policy analysts, of which she counts herself one. Id. at 29.
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enforced prescriptions concerning what actions (or outcomes) are required,
prohibited, or permitted.' '31 She describes how rules can emerge through
processes of democratic governance, or through groups of people who
organize privately, such as corporations or membership associations, or
within a family or work team..32 Rules can evolve as working rules that are a
function of what individuals decide to do in practice. In other words, her
concept of rules would encompass rules in DSD structures that governments
create, those that parties mutually negotiate, and those that one corporate
player imposes on a weaker party in an economic transaction.
Moreover, institutional analysis is aimed at all institutions-both those
within an open, democratic society governed by the rule of law and also
those in other systems where rules and attempts to enforce them exist, but
people generally try to get away with noncompliance. 33 Rules are also
formulated in language, an imperfect and sometimes ambiguous tool, and
hence they depend upon a generally shared understanding of meaning by
humans who interpret and apply them in action situations. Thus, rules may or
may not be predictable and may or may not produce stability in human
action. Compliance with rules is a function of monitoring and enforcement. 34
Ostrom observes that it is also a function of a shared sense that the rules
are "appropriate." 35 One might argue that this word is an indirect way to say
that people view the rules as just on some measure or definition of justice.
The second cluster of exogenous variables concerns the biophysical and
material world.36 These encompass not only what is actually physically
possible, but also notions of goods and services, costs and benefits. Goods
and services, particularly in the economics literature, are categorized by
whether they are excludable (how hard it is to keep others from having or
using them) or subtractable (whether if you use them there are fewer or less
31 Id. at 18. This is a "rule" in the sense of a regulation adopted by an authority.
Ostrom describes three other possible definitions of rules from the literature of social
science; specifically rules as instructions for successful strategies, or rules as precepts
such as the Golden Rule, or rules as principles that can be true or false, such as the laws
of physics. Id. at 17-18.
32 OsTRoM, supra note 18, at 19.
33 Id. at 20. She describes this as rules-in-form being consistent, or inconsistent, with
rules-in-practice.
34 Id. at 21.
35 Id.
3 6 Id. at 15.
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for everyone else).37 Low excludability creates the free rider problem. High
subtractability requires effective rules.
These categories can be viewed as contexts within which people
experience conflict or as things over which people have disputes. They are
thus useful for analyzing the nature of cases that go through a DSD and the
outcomes that are possible. For example, environmental conflict resolution
often addresses disputes over common pool natural resources.38 Commercial
contracts usually entail disputes over private goods. DSDs, in an effort to
foster transitional justice, have as their goal the creation of public goods such
as safety, security, and stability.39 The nature of the cases or conflict subject
to the design helps inform our assessment of its structure's effectiveness and
also helps define the universe of outcomes from the design. It may also
foreshadow expectations about what kind of justice the DSD should produce.
The third cluster of variables involves community. 40 Of particular
relevance are generally accepted values of behavior (sometimes called
culture), the level of shared or common understanding about the structure of
the action arena, the homogeneity of their preferences, the size of the
community, and the level of income or asset inequality. 41 These variables
help us understand and identify some of the differences between indigenous
peoples' institutions for addressing conflict 42 and those of traditional
Western institutions. 43 They can inform analysis of how a DSD entailing
37 Id. at 23. These two dimensions yield four categories of goods: toll or club,
private, and public goods, and common pool resources. Toll or club goods are low in both
excludability and subtractability (the Massachusetts Turnpike); private goods are high in
subtractability but easy to exclude people from or low in excludability (buying things at
Wal-Mart); public goods are not subtractable and hard to exclude people from (peace);
and common pool resources are high in subtractibility and hard to exclude people from
(fish in the sea). Id. at 24.
38 OSTROM, supra note 18, at 255-80.
39 Run G. TEITEL, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 11 (2000) (rejecting a single absolute
definition ofjustice in favor of one that is contextual, multiple, and relative).
40 OSTROM, supra note 18, at 15.
4 1 Id at 26-27.
42 See, e.g., William Bradford, "With a Very Great Blame on Our Hearts":
Reparations, Reconciliation, and an American Indian Plea for Peace with Justice, 27
AM. INDIAN L. REv. 1 (2002) (describing Native American institutions for resolving
conflict).
4 3 See, e.g., ELIZABETH PLAPINGER & DONNA STIENSTRA, ADR AND SETTLEMENT IN
THE FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS: A SOURCEBOOK FOR JUDGES & LAWYERS (1996)
(describing the elements of court-connected DSDs in the U.S. federal district courts and
reporting on the variation of designs).
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mediation in Korea" or Japan45 might differ from that in a community
mediation center in the U.S. 46
Institutional analysis provides a structure that we need to apply
systematically and rigorously to DSD. As Ostrom observes, "[w]ithout the
capacity to undertake systematic, comparative institutional assessments,
recommendations of reform may be based on naive ideas about which kinds
of institutions are 'good' or 'bad' and not on an analysis of performance. 47
Institutional analysis can bring a higher level of conversation to the field of
dispute resolution, beyond a debate over evaluative, facilitative, or
transformative mediation, beyond a debate over whether mandatory
arbitration is right or wrong, but toward an understanding of process in
context.
What institutional analysis does not bring to the conversation is the
normative concept of justice. Institutional analysts are examining the
performance and outcomes of an institution from the standpoint of how they
affect relevant public policy. This form of analysis is essential for the field of
DSD; however, it is not sufficient. In addition to using institutional analysis,
DSD analysts should be examining the performance and outcomes of a
particular design in relation to its impact on some conception of justice.
II. DISPUTE SYSTEM DESIGN
As a field, DSD is correctly understood as a form of institutional design.
Perhaps it is best understood as applied institutional design, or institutional
design in practice. First, this section will sketch the evolution of DSD as a
44 See, e.g., Nam Hyeon Kim et al., Community and Industrial Mediation in South
Korea, 37 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 361 (1993); Dong-Won Sohn and James A. Wall, Jr.,
Community Mediation in South Korea: A City-Village Comparison, 37 J. CONFLICT
RESOL. 536 (1993).
45 See, e.g., Ronda Roberts Callister & James A. Wall, Jr., Japanese Community and
Organizational Mediation, 41 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 311 (1997).
46 See, e.g., Patrick G. Coy & Timothy Hedeen, A Stage Model of Social Movement
Co-optation: Community Mediation in the United States, 46 Soc. Q. 405 (2005)
(describing Western community mediation); Julia Ann Gold, ADR Through a Cultural
Lens: How Cultural Values Shape Our Disputing Processes, 2005 J. DisP. RESOL. 289
(2005) (describing the disconnect between Western-style mediation and Nepalese
culture); Timothy Hedeen, Institutionalizing Community Mediation: Can Dispute
Resolution "of by, and for the People" Long Endure?, 108 PENN ST. L. REv. 265 (2003)
(describing the changes to community mediation as it moves away from an independent
institution for neighborhoods to an institution embedded in the courts, among other
changes).
47 OSTROM, supra note 18, at 29.
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field. Second, I present an evolving catalogue of structural variables that
researchers have used to compare designs in the field of ADR. Third, I
describe the problem of control over DSD and argue it is one to which
researchers should pay more attention. In each section, I give examples of
how we might use institutional analysis to deepen our understanding of DSD.
A. DSD in Organizations
Although DSD applies to a wide variety of systems, as a field it emerged
in the context of organizational conflict and workplace disputes. Historically,
organizations reacted to conflict--they did not systematically plan how to
manage it. They used existing administrative or judicial forums to address
it.4 8 Organizations became dissatisfied with traditional time-consuming and
costly processes that often did not produce satisfactory outcomes.49
Workplace conflict often resulted in inefficiency; a quality conflict
management system was essential. 50 Lipsky, Seeber, and Fincher suggest
that the rise of ADR in the workplace reflects a changing social contract
between employers and employees. 51 In the first part of the twentieth
century, employers dictated workplace rules. Through collective bargaining
protected by law, unions began to change the top-down workplace structure;
these negotiations yielded the private justice system of grievance arbitration.
Today, with unionism in decline, a new system of conflict resolution is
emerging. 52
These changes have led to the concept of DSD, a term coined by
Professors William Ury, Jeanne Brett, and Stephen Goldberg to describe the
purposeful creation of an ADR program in an organization through which it
manages conflict through a series of steps or options for process. 53 They
4 8 DAVID B. LIPSKY ET AL., EMERGING SYSTEMS FOR MANAGING WORKPLACE
CONFLICT: LESSONS FROM AMERICAN CORPORATIONS FOR MANAGERS AND DISPUTE
RESOLUTION PROFESSIONALS 6 (2003). The authors also observe that DSD may serve as a
union avoidance strategy.
49 Id.
50 Id. at 7-8.
5 1 Id. at 36.
52 Id. at 29-74 (describing a much more detailed account of the changing social
contract in the United States).
53 WILLIAM L. URY ET AL., GETTING DISPUTES RESOLVED: DESIGNING SYSTEMS TO
CUT THE COST OF CONFLICT 41-64 (1988). Interest-based systems focus on the
disputants' underlying needs (interests), such as those for security, economic well-being,
belonging to a social group, recognition from others, and autonomy or control. Rights-
based processes focus on legal entitlements under the language of a contract, statute,
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argued that dispute resolution processes can focus on interests, rights, or
power,54 but that organizational conflict management systems will function
better for the stakeholders if they focus primarily on interests. A healthy
system should only use rights-based approaches (arbitration or litigation).as a
fallback when disputants reached impasse; parties should not generally resort
to power.
Organizational DSDs can take a myriad of forms, including a multi-step
procedure culminating in mediation, arbitration, ombudspersons 55 programs
giving disputants many different process choices,56 or simply a single-step
binding arbitration design. The field of dispute resolution broadly adapted the
concept of DSD beyond organizations with employment conflict and courts
to other legal and administrative contexts. There are growing numbers of
conflict management or dispute resolution programs in the substantive areas
of education, the environment, criminal justice, community or neighborhood
justice, domestic relations and family law and in settings ranging from
regulation, or court decision. Power-based systems are least effective as a basis for
resolving conflict; workplace examples include strikes, lockouts, and corporate
campaigns. Their work on dispute system design grew from experience with industrial
disputes in the coal industry. After a series of wildcat strikes, it became clear that the
traditional multi-step grievance procedure culminating in binding arbitration was not
meeting the needs of coal miners, unions, and management. Ury, Brett, and Goldberg
suggested an experiment: grievance mediation. This involved providing mediation, a
process for resolving conflict based on interests, as soon as disputes arose. The addition
of the grievance mediation step changed the traditional rights-based grievance arbitration
dispute system design to one including an interest-based "loop-back," i.e., a step that
returned the disputants to negotiation, albeit with assistance.
54 Id. at 3-19. Recent experimental work empirically supports the emphasis on
interests in DSD. See Jean Poitras & Aurdlia Le Tareau, Dispute Resolution Patterns and
Organizational Dispute States, 19 INT'L. J. CONFLICT MGMT. 72, 84 (2008).
55 An ombudsperson program is an organizational dispute system design in which
one person, generally with direct access to upper management, serves as a contact point
for all streams of conflict in the organization, and assists employees and consumers with
identifying an appropriate process for addressing disputes. See International Ombuds
Association, http://www.ombudsassociation.org (last visited Feb. 7, 2009); Mary P.
Rowe, The Ombudsman's Role in a Dispute Resolution System, 7 NEGOT. J. 353 (1991).
56 Some argue that best practice in institutional DSD is represented by the integrated
conflict management system, a system in which there are multiple points of entry and
parallel processes suited to the variety of conflicts in the organization, whether with
employees, suppliers, service providers, contractors, consumers, customers, clients,
community, or the broader public. See generally CATHY A. COSTANTINO & CHRISTINA
SICKLES MERCHANT, DESIGNING CONFLICT MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS: A GUIDE TO
CREATING PRODUCTIVE AND HEALTHY ORGANIZATIONS (1996); Association for Conflict
Resolution, http://www.acrnet.org (last visited Feb. 7, 2009).
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federal, state, and local governments to a variety of private and nonprofit
organizations. 57
B. Elements of DSD: Choices Become Rules That Create Structures
We can use Ostrom's framework to better understand and identify the
elements of DSD. If one surveys program evaluations on both court-
annexed 58 and stand-alone ADR programs, one can identify a number of
distinct structural variables and/or choices that make up a DSD.59 These
include, but are not limited to:
1. The sector or setting for the program (public, private, or nonprofit);
2. The overall dispute system design (integrated conflict management
system, silo or stovepipe program, ombuds program, outside contractor);
57 For review articles on field studies and evaluation of the uses of mediation and
DSD in the contexts of employment, education, criminal justice, the environment, family
disputes, civil litigation in courts, and community disputes, see Symposium, Conflict
Resolution in the Field, 22 CONFLICT RESOL. Q. 1, 1-320 (2004). DSD occurs within and
outside the context of a single organization. Courts and administrative agencies engage in
DSD when they adopt alternative dispute resolution programs or supervise mass tort
claim systems. For extensive background on DSD efforts in the federal government, see
Interagency Alternative Dispute Resolution Working Group, http://www.adr.gov/ (last
visited Feb. 7, 2009). For evaluation reports reflecting the results of DSD in the federal
courts, see Federal Judicial Center, http://www.fjc.gov/ (last visited Feb. 7, 2009). For
similar reports reflecting DSD in state courts, see National Center for State Courts,
http://www.ncsc.org (last visited Feb. 7, 2009). DSD has addressed the design of legal
institutions and constitutions. See Janet Martinez & Stephanie Smith, Dispute System
Diagnosis & Design, 14 HARV. NEGOT. L. REv. (Forthcoming 2009).
58 An excellent resource on DSD in the federal courts is PLAPINGER & STIENSTRA,
supra note 43. For an analysis of evaluations of state and federal court ADR programs
with descriptions of their design, see The Resolution Systems Institute: Program
Evaluations, http://aboutrsi.org/publications.php?slD=9 [hereinafter "RSI"] (last visited
Feb. 7, 2009).
59 1 first prepared this list as a suggested frame for contributors to a special double
issue of CONFLICT RESOLUTION QUARTERLY intended to address the challenge to prove
that dispute resolution makes a difference. The project was funded by the William and
Flora Hewlett Foundation in 2003. In collaboration with CRQ and its then editor-in-chief
Tricia Jones, the Indiana Conflict Resolution Institute at Indiana University
commissioned review articles summarizing the field and applied research literature on
different substantive areas of practice in the field of dispute resolution. The goal was to
capture results in the "grey literature" of program evaluations not published in traditional
academic outlets. Articles summarized evaluations of DSDs in employment, the
environment, education, courts, community justice, restorative justice, and domestic
relations or family law. Invited commentators also offered suggestions for future
research. See Symposium, supra note 57, at 1-320.
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3. The subject matter of the conflicts, disputes, or cases over which the
system has jurisdiction; 60
4. The participants eligible or required to use the system; 61
5. The timing of the intervention (before the complaint is filed,
immediately thereafter, after discovery or information gathering is complete,
and on the eve of an administrative hearing or trial);
6. Whether the intervention is voluntary, opt out, or mandatory;
7. The nature of the intervention (training, facilitation, consensus-
building, negotiated rulemaking, mediation, early neutral assessment or
evaluation, summary jury trial,62 non-binding arbitration, binding arbitration)
and its possible outcomes;
8. The sequence of interventions, if more than one;
9. Within intervention, the model of practice (if mediation, evaluative,
facilitative or transformative; if arbitration, rights or interests, last-best offer,
issue-by-issue or package, high-low, etc.);
10. The nature, training, qualifications, and demographics of the
neutrals; 63
11. Who pays for the neutrals and the nature of their financial or
professional incentive structure;64
12. Who pays for the costs of administration, filing fees, hearing fees,
hearing space;
13. The nature of any due process protections (right to counsel,
discovery, location of process, availability of class actions, availability of
written opinion or decision);
60 E.g., Victoria Malkin, Community Courts and the Process of Accountability:
Consensus and Conflict at the Red Hook Community Justice Center, 40 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 1573 (2003) (discussing neighborhood disputes).
61 For example, drug treatment courts provide an alternative to traditional criminal
prosecution and incarceration for drug users. Michael C. Doff & Charles F. Sabel, Drug
Treatment Courts and Emergent Experimentalist Government, 53 VAND. L. REV. 831,
852-61 (2000) (describing how drug courts collaborate with service providers to
coordinate the services provided).
62 See generally Donna Shestowsky, Improving Summary Jury Trials: Insights from
Psychology, 18 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 469 (2003); Neil Vidmar & Jeffrey Rice,
Jury-Determined Settlements and Summary Jury Trials: Observations About Alternative
Dispute Resolution in an Adversary Culture, 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 89 (1991).
63 See, e.g., Robert J. MacCoun, Comparing Legal Fac~rinders: Real and Mock
Amateur and Professional, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 511, 512-17 (2005).
64 On one mechanism for handling arbitration costs, see Christopher R. Drahozal,
Arbitration Costs and Contingent Fee Contracts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 729 (2006) (arguing
that arbitration costs are generally not a barrier to asserting a claim in arbitration).
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• 14. Structural support and institutionalization with respect to conflict
management programs or efforts to implement; and
1.5. Level of self-determination or control that disputants have as to
process, outcome, and dispute system design. Is it both parties together, one
party unilaterally, or a third party for them?
Each of these categories entails a structural element of the DSD.
Moreover, each of the choices must be embodied in a contract, policy,
guideline, regulation, statute, or other form of rule.
Ostrom argues that there are three related concepts: strategies, norms,
and rules: "[I]ndividuals adopt strategies in light of the norms they hold and
within the rules of the situation within which they are interacting." 65 Even
when we limit our use of rules to regulation or prescription subject to
enforcement, there are nevertheless many types of rules.66 Arguing that we
need to use simplified, broad, and general types or classes of rules to
accumulate comparable research and advance the field of institutional design,
Ostrom proposes seven kinds of rules: rules regarding positions, boundaries,
choices, aggregation, information, payoffs, and scope.67
Using Ostrom's categories, designers identify who is eligible to use the
program; this is a position rule. For example, some federal sector employers
have adopted mediation programs that only people who file an Equal
Employment Opportunity complaint may invoke. 68 Designers identify what
65 OSTROM, supra note 18, at 175.
6 6 Id. at 18. See generally id. at 186-215 for a description of different kinds of rules.
6 7 Id. at 190. Ostrom provides very general definitions:
Position rules create positions (e.g. member of a legislature or a committee, voter,
etc.). Boundary rules affect how individuals are assigned to or leave positions and
how one situation is linked to other situations. Choice rules affect the assignment of
particular action sets to positions. Aggregation rules affect the level of control that
individual participants exercise at a linkage within or across situations. Information
rules affect the level of information available in a situation about actions and the link
between actions and outcome linkages. Payoff rules affect the benefits and costs
assigned to outcomes given the actions chosen. Scope rules affect which outcomes
must, must not, or may be affected within a domain.
Id.
68 The largest employment mediation program in the world is the United States
Postal Service's REDRESS® Program, which is open to EEO complainants. Lisa
Blomgren Bingham et al., Dispute System Design and Justice in Employment Dispute
Resolution: Mediation at the Workplace, 14 HARv. NEGOT. L. REV. (forthcoming 2009);
see also LISA B. BINGHAM, MEDIATION AT WORK: TRANSFORMING WORKPLACE
CONFLICT AT THE UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE. (IBM Center for the Business of
Government 2003), available at
http://www.businessofgovernment.org/pdfs/BinghamReport.pdf.; Lisa Blomgren
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cases the design will cover; this is a boundary rule. For example, some
federal agencies only permit mediation of discrimination complaints, while
others broaden their program to encompass a wider variety of workplace
conflict, such as mentoring disputes outside of EEO law. 69 An ADR program
may be voluntary, mandatory, or opt out; this is a choice rule because it
defines what action or action set a person/position has in the program. For
example, some courts have mandated nonbinding arbitration as a pre-
requisite to a civil trial. 70
Aggregation rules are critically important in negotiated rulemaking and
environmental or public policy consensus-building designs. Are the parties
going to decide outcomes by unanimous consensus or are they going to use a
majority vote rules? 71 One can imagine that unanimous consensus rules
would make it harder for a collaborative network to take action compared to
majority vote because one party could exercise a veto.
DSDs that restrict discovery, as in some of the early abuses in
mandatory, adhesive employment arbitration programs, are clearly rules
about what information participants can use in the DSD to persuade the
neutral or the other participants. 72 DSDs can also limit the award or outcome
of the process or intervention, which represent payoff rules. For example,
some arbitration plans have high-low provisions that determine at the outset
the maximum and minimum award an arbitrator may order.73 The early
Bingham et al., Mediation of Discrimination Complaints at the USPS: Purpose Drives
Practice, in ARBITRATION 2007: WORKPLACE JUSTICE FOR A CHANGING ENvIRONMENT:
PROCEEDINGS OF THE SIcIETH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF
ARBITRATORS, 269 (Stephen F. Befort & Patrick Halter eds., 2007).
69 Howard Gadlin is the Ombudsperson for the National Institutes of Health and has
written extensively about ombuds programs that have this broader scope.
70 Deborah R. Hensler, Suppose It's Not True: Challenging Mediation Ideology,
2002 J. DisP. RESOL. 81, 94-99 (2002) (critiquing mandatory mediation and advocating
arbitration in court-connected programs as a dignified alternative to trial).
71 In environmental conflict resolution, which is characterized by the participation of
many parties representing diverse stakeholders, DSD is the first phase of the process. See
generally THE CONSENSUS BUILDING HANDBOOK 61-168 (Lawrence Susskind et al. eds.,
1999) (discussing issues of who designs and structures a consensus process, the design
phase, and the design committee); Lawrence E. Susskind & Jeffrey L. Cruikshank,
BREAKING ROBERT'S RULES: THE NEW WAY TO RUN YOUR MEETING, BUILD CONSENSUS,
AND GET RESULTS 169-190 (2006).
72 Mei L. Bickner et al., Developments in Employment Arbitration: Analysis of a
New Survey of Employment Arbitration Programs, 52 Disp. RESOL. J., Jan. 1997, at 8, 80.
73 See, e.g., Frank E. A. Sander & Lukasz Rozdeiczer, Matching Cases and Dispute
Resolution Procedures: Detailed Analysis Leading to a Mediation-Centered Approach,
11 HARv. NEGOT. L. REv. 1, 14 (2006) ("a party may want the recovery not to be larger or
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version of the Administrative Dispute Resolution Act,74 which authorized
federal agency use of ADR, provided that the federal agency could reject the
supposedly "binding" arbitration award; the other party could not.75 Using
Ostrom's categories, this rule imposed additional process costs on the non-
federal party. Not surprisingly, parties were reluctant under this rule to agree
voluntarily to arbitrate with the agency, and under the statute, agencies could
not mandate arbitration. Subsequently, this rule was changed to improve the
functioning of federal DSDs involving arbitration.
When the DSD entails mediation, that choice of process is a form of
scope rule; it determines that the neutral does not have the authority to take
the action of imposing an outcome on the disputants.76 Cooling off periods
that allow the parties to reject a tentative agreement reached in mediation
within a certain period are also scope rules in that they define the range of
possible outcomes of the DSD.77
The purpose of this exercise is to illustrate how we might more
systematically analyze and compare the implicit rule choices in varying
DSDs. Once we can compare the rules, we can better understand the
differences in outcomes that systems produce. This is policy analysis, and it
is implicit in the calls for research on dispute resolution.7 8
smaller than a certain number and will agree to a resolution only within that range (high-
low arbitration)").
74 Alternative Means of Dispute Resolution in the Administrative Process, 5 U.S.C.
§§ 571-584 (2007) [hereinafter "ADRA"].
75 Cynthia B. Dauber, Comment, The Ties That Do Not Bind: Nonbinding
Arbitration in Federal Administrative Agencies, 9 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 165, 185-86
(1995); see also Lisa B. Bingham & Charles R. Wise, The Administrative Dispute
Resolution Act of 1990: How Do We Evaluate its Success? 6 J. PuB. ADMIN. RES. &
THEORY 383 (1996); Jeffrey M. Senger, FEDERAL DISPuTE RESOLUTION: USING ADR
WITH THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT (2003).
76 For detailed descriptions of alternative mediation practices, see Christopher
Moore, THE MEDIATION PROCESS: PRACTICAL STRATEGIES FOR RESOLVING CONFLICT (3d
ed. 2003) (facilitative mediation); Robert A. Baruch Bush & Joseph P. Folger, THE
PROMISE OF MEDIATION: THE TRANSFORMATIVE APPROACH TO CONFLICT 41-84 (2005)
(transformative mediation).
77 Nancy Welsh, The Thinning Vision of Self-Determination in Court-Connected
Mediation: The Inevitable Price of Institutionalization?, 6 HARV. NEGOT. L. REv. 1, 86-
89 (2001) (advocating a cooling off period to counter undue mediator pressure to settle).
78 See generally Lisa B. Bingham, Why Suppose? Let's Find Out: A Public Policy
Research Program on Dispute Resolution, 2002 J. DISP. RESOL. 101 (2002) (arguing for
policy analysis on how DSD affects mediation outcomes); Gregory Todd Jones, Fighting
Capitulation: A Research Agenda for the Future of Dispute Resolution, 108 PENN ST. L.
REv. 277 (2003) (outlining an ambitious multi-disciplinary and inter-disciplinary research
agenda for the field of dispute resolution); John Lande, Commentary, Focusing on
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There have been efforts to evaluate and assess dispute resolution that
take into account elements of DSD. Research reviews examine court
programs 79 and programs in employment, 80 education, 81 the environment, 82
community mediation,83 family and domestic relations ADR,84 and victim-
offender mediation or restorative justice.85
Program Design Issues in Future Research on Court-Connected Mediation, 22 CONFLICT
RESOL. Q. 89, 93-97 (2004) (arguing that researchers should examine outcomes including
substantive justice, empowerment and recognition, and interest-based problem solving).
79 For an analysis of evaluations of state and federal court ADR programs with
descriptions of their design, see The Resolution Systems Institute, supra note 58; Thomas
J. Stipanowich, ADR and the "Vanishing Trial": The Growth and Impact of "Alternative
Dispute Resolution," 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 843 (2004); for a recent review of
court-connected ADR using DSD as its organizing frame, see Roselle L. Wissler, The
Effectiveness of Court-Connected Dispute Resolution in Civil Cases, 22 CONFLICT
RESOL. Q. 55 (2004); Lande, supra note 78.
80 Lisa B. Bingham, Employment Dispute Resolution: The Case for Mediation, 22
CONFLICT RES. Q. 145 (2004) (concluding that DSDs using mediation has proven itself
capable of producing positive organizational outcomes, while there is no evidence that
nonunion employment arbitration has that impact); see also David B. Lipsky & Ariel C.
Avgar, Commentary, Research on Employment Dispute Resolution: Toward a New
Paradigm, 22 CONFLICT RESOL. Q. 175 (2004) (advocating multivariate models and more
sophisticated statistical techniques to measure the impact of employment dispute
resolution).
81 Tricia S. Jones, Conflict Resolution Education: The Field, the Findings, and the
Future, 22 CONFLICT RESOL. Q. 233, 243-51 (2004) (reporting that peer mediation in
elementary schools has positive outcomes for student mediators in that they gain in social
and emotional intelligence, and schools gain in improved classroom and school climate,
while there is some but less evidence for middle school and high school programs, and
arguing for more assessment on curriculum, including conflict resolution, bullying
prevention, dialogue, and communicative arts); Jennifer Batton, Commentary,
Considering Conflict Resolution Education: Next Steps for Institutionalization, 22
CONFLICT RESOL. Q. 269, 270-76 (2004) (arguing for institutionalization of conflict
resolution education across programs and for all educators).
82 E. Franklin Dukes, What We Know About Environmental Conflict Resolution: An
Analysis Based on Research, 22 CONFLICT RESOL. Q. 191, 192 (2004) (identifying key
structural elements that distinguish environmental conflict resolution from other uses of
mediation, including its use for upstream conflict in policy making and planning); Kirk
Emerson, Rosemary O'Leary, & Lisa B. Bingham, Commentary, Comment on Frank
Dukes's "What We Know About Environmental Conflict Resolution," 22 CONFLICT
RESOL. Q. 221, 223-29 (2004) (describing a national database for environmental conflict
resolution cases through which data on design differences and outcomes will accumulate
over time).
83 Timothy Hedeen, The Evolution and Evaluation of Community Mediation:
Limited Research Suggests Unlimited Progress, 22 CONFLICT RESOL. Q. 101 (2004)
(reporting that community mediation centers handle cases in a cost and time effective
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However, we need to do a much closer reading of the actual designs. At
present, much DSD literature is normative and advocates 'good process' in
way while resolving a broad array of disputes in an appropriate and respectful way). On
the need for research related to program design, Hedeen observes, "[o]rganizational-level
research into case screening criteria and methods, referral systems and funding
relationships, program accessibility, and outreach efforts will benefit the field greatly,
providing the basis for informed planning and decision making, as well as enhanced
services." Id. at 126. He also raises the question of whether community mediation
democratizes justice and leads to greater self-sufficiency. Id. at 127; see also Linda
Baron, Commentary, The Case for the Field of Community Mediation, 22 CONFLICT
RESOL. Q. 135, 135-36 (2004) (articulating a strategy for action through consistent data
collection across varying centers implemented through a mini-grant program by the
National Association for Community Mediation with support from the Hewlett
Foundation).
84 Joan B. Kelly, Family Mediation Research: Is There Empirical Support for the
Field?, 22 CONFLICT RESOL. Q. 3 (2004). Kelly's introduction highlights our need for
more systematic institutional analysis in dispute system design:
Variations in research populations, methodologies, measures, and dispute settings
have been the norm, making it problematic to generalize about family mediation or
rely on a single study. Many research publications failed to provide basic
descriptors, such as the nature of the population served, number of sessions and
hours of service, the model (if any) mediators used, and whether premediation
screening was used. Legal rules and cultural contexts of the jurisdiction that might
affect outcomes were rarely described. Despite these problems, convergence on
many questions has emerged over two decades, indicating that some major findings
regarding family mediation are robust and replicable across settings.
Id. at 3-4. Based on studies of mediation in California, Colorado, Ohio, Virginia, and
Ontario, Canada, Kelly concludes that mediation has proven itself capable of settling
highly emotional disputes (settlement rates range from fifty percent to ninety percent)
with durable resolutions and high participant satisfaction, although higher when there is
an agreement than without. Id. at 28-29. In addition, she reports that participants felt
heard, respected, given a chance to say what was important, and not pressured to settle.
Id. at 29. They also felt they had learned to work together and that the agreement would
be good for their children. Id. at 29; See also Donald T. Saposnek, Commentary, The
Future of the History of Family Mediation Research, 22 CONFLICT RESOL. Q. 37, 38-49
(2004) (advocating research that is longitudinal, and examines antecedent conditions,
screening and triage of cases, the actual process of mediation, and outcomes for children).
85 Mark S. Umbreit et al., Victim-Offender Mediation: Three Decades of Practice
and Research, 22 CONFLICT RESOL. Q. 279, 287-96 (2004) (concluding that victim-
offender mediation is usually effective at meeting the needs of those who participate,
generally has a positive impact on restitution and recidivism rates, and has potential to
reduce the costs of certain juvenile and criminal cases); Howard Zehr, Commentary,
Restorative Justice: Beyond Victim-Offender Mediation, 22 CONFLICT RESOL. Q. 305,
305-06 (2004) (describing other models of restorative justice, including family group
conferences and peacemaking circles).
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creating the design rather than addressing the substance and outcomes of the
rule choices. 86 For example, commentators on DSD discuss how we should
involve stakeholders in design and evaluation 87 rather than the fundamental
power imbalance between employer and employee that shapes the underlying
at-will employment contract 88 or that defines the ability of an employer to
relocate union work to another country.89 DSD analysis should include rules
that define substantive rights in the system. The collective bargaining
agreement's requirement for just cause for discipline is a choice rule in
Ostrom's framework; it affects the assignment of particular action sets to
positions. Under a just cause rule, the position of employer is no longer free
to fire an employee at will, with or without cause, for no reason or any reason
except those prohibited by law. 90
86 See, e.g., COSTANTINO & SICKLES MERCHANT, supra note 56 at 49-66, 73-92, 96-
116, 168-86 (discussing the role of the consultant or contractor, the use of focus groups
to involve stakeholders, the need to do an organizational assessment, and the need to
build in evaluation to foster continuous innovation and improvement). This is not to
suggest that "good process" is a bad thing, only that it is necessary but not sufficient.
8 7 Id. at 69-95 and 168-87; John Lande, Using Dispute System Design Methods to
Promote Good-Faith Participation in Court-Connected Mediation Programs, 50 UCLA
L. REv. 69, 111 (2002) (advocating local decisionmaking in the design of court-connected
mediation programs).
88 See, e.g., Clyde Summers, Employment At Will in the United States: The Divine
Right of Employers, 3 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 65, 66-84 (2000).
This distinctive aspect of American labor law is more than a minor oddity
concerning protection from dismissal. Its tentacles reach into seemingly remote
areas of labor law, for at its roots is a fundamental legal assumption regarding the
relation between an employer and its employees. The assumption is that the
employee is only a supplier of labor who has no legal interest or stake in the
enterprise other than the right to be paid for labor performed. The employer, as
owner of the enterprise, is legally endowed with the sole right to determine all
matters conceming the operation of the enterprise. This includes the work performed
and the continued employment of its employees. The law, by giving total dominance
to the employer, endows the employer with the divine right to rule the working lives
of its subject employees.
Id. at 65.
89 Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt & Timothy A. Haley, Governance of the Workplace:
The Contemporary Regime of Individual Contract, 28 CoMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 313,
315-27 (2007) (comparing employee rights under individual contract and collective
bargaining agreements).
90 Martin H. Malin, The Distributive and Corrective Justice Concerns in the Debate
over Employment At-Will: Some Preliminary Thoughts, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 117, 145
(1992) ("Control over employment termination is a major determinant of workplace
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
. We are caught in what Ostrom calls a "babbling equilibrium." 91 We talk
about research results and outcomes in DSD, but we are not using the same
language to describe the rules and norms we study, and thus we cannot share
meaning. For example, in a recent evaluation of community mediation
programs nationwide, researchers had to include multiple ways of defining
what counts as a "case." 92 Is a case a phone call, individual conflict
coaching, a mediation intake, completed interviews with the disputants, or an
actual mediation session? Not all programs do coaching or interviews before
the actual mediation session. Certain small claims court programs provide
mediation to the parties with no prior intake process. 93 Before we can talk
about the relative justice a DSD produces, we need to be able to compare
designs meaningfully and systematically.
C. Institutions for Managing Conflict and the Problem of Control Over
Design
Ostrom has herself conducted and also collected extensive empirical
research on institutions for managing conflict over common pool resources in
environmental and other settings.94 Through these, she tested and refined a
set of design principles that characterize robust institutions, defined as
institutions that persist, are stable, and adapt to changing circumstances. 95
These design principles include clearly defined boundaries of the resource
and clearly defined rights of individuals who can take it, proportional
equivalence between benefits and costs, collective choice arrangements,
monitoring, graduated sanctions, conflict-resolution mechanisms, minimal
recognition of rights to organize, and nested enterprises in which
appropriation, enforcement, monitoring, conflict resolution, and governance
are nested in layers. All institutions are amenable to institutional analysis;
DSDs as institutions can be critiqued through this set of principles. Of
particular salience are principles of collective choice arrangements, minimal
recognition of the rights to organize, monitoring, and governance.
power. The debate over employment at-will focuses on the appropriate approach to the
legal regulation of this power.").
91 OSTROM, supra note 18, at 176.
92 Beth Gazley, Won Kyung Chang & Lisa Blomgren Bingham, Collaboration and
Citizen Participation in Community Mediation Centers, 23 REV. POL'Y RES. 843 (2006).
93 Wissler, supra note 79 at 56-57 (finding that in small claims mediation programs,
mediation usually occurs on the same day as the trial and that the mediator generally has
no information about the case prior to mediation).
94 OSTROM, supra note 18, at 258-80
95 She first described these in OSTROM, supra note 17.
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Collective choice arrangements are those in which people who are
subject to the rules are included in the group who can make or change the
rules.96 This is functionally the same as what I previously characterized as
control over DSD. 97 Dispute systems vary across two separate dimensions of
disputant self-determination or control: control over the full system design,
and control over a given case using a specific process provided by that
design. 98 Control over DSD includes the power to make choices regarding
the rules that create the design: for example, what cases are subject to the
process, which process or sequence of processes are available, what due
process rules apply, and other structural aspects of a private justice system in
the list provided above. Within a DSD, control over a given case can address
process and/or outcome. One or more parties may give control over the
process to a mediator, while they both retain control over the outcome. In
mediation, the outcome may be impasse or a voluntary, negotiated
settlement. In arbitration, one or more parties may give control over outcome
to a third party to issue a binding decision.
Dispute systems, and arguably the justice they produce, vary depending
on who is exercising control over their design. The key questions are: (1)
who is designing the system; (2) what are their goals, and (3) how have they
exercised their power. DSDs generally fall into one of three categories: (1)
two or more disputants subject to the system jointly design it (all disputants
or parties design); (2) a court, agency, or other third party designs it for the
benefit of disputants (third party design); and (3) a single disputant with
stronger economic power designs it and imposes it on the other disputant
(one party design).
For example, historically, the public civil justice system is the product of
design by a third party: the judicial branch with funding from the legislative
96 OSTROM, supra note 18, at 259.
97 Lisa B. Bingham, Control Over Dispute-System Design and Mandatory
Commercial Arbitration, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs. 221 (2004) (arguing that control
over dispute system design shifts the settlement value of cases in commercial mandatory
arbitration); Lisa B. Bingham, Self-Determination in Dispute System Design and
Employment Arbitration, 56 U. MIAMI L. REv. 873 (2002) (arguing that control over
dispute system design changes outcomes in employment arbitration); Bingham, supra
note 78 (arguing that control over dispute system design makes a difference in mediation
outcomes).
98 For purposes of this discussion, I will use the term "control" to discuss the dispute
system design level of analysis. I have previously used the terms "self-determination"
and "control" synonymously, recognizing that in other contexts, authors may distinguish
between the two.
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branch acting for the benefit of disputants. 99 In a sense, this is a system
designed through collective choice rules, in that it is designed under the
'auspices of a constitutional form of government in which voters elect
legislators who provide appropriations for the judicial branch. There are at
least minimal rights to organize in that court-connected DSDs allow people
to have the representation of their choice. Public interest litigants can
participate. There can be mediation of a class action or built into a mass
tort. 100 Moreover, there is monitoring in third party designs.' 0 ' The
government tracks its systems. 102 Courts monitor mediator misconduct.10 3
Courts enforce the outcomes of the DSD.104 They adopt consent decrees 10 5
and enforce rules on confidentiality. 106 There is some ongoing debate as to
the costs and benefits of court-connected DSDs, but their widespread
adoption and institutionalization would suggest that these are in rough
balance.
Traditionally, private justice systems arise when both or all parties to a
dispute have negotiated dispute system design in their contracts, for example
in labor relations or commercial contracts. Moreover, they have done so in
the shadow of the public justice system, specifically, the courts and
99 For a number of downloadable publications evaluating ADR programs in a
variety of federal courts, see the website of the Federal Judicial Center,
http://www.fjc.gov (last visited Feb. 7, 2009).
100 Hensler, supra note 10; Francis E. McGovern, Settlement of Mass Torts in a
Federal System, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 871 (2001); Francis E. McGovern, The
Tragedy of the Asbestos Commons, 88 VA. L. REV. 1721 (2002); Carrie Menkel-Meadow,
Taking the Mass Out of Mass Torts: Reflections of a Dalkon Shield Arbitrator on
Alternative Dispute Resolution, Judging, Neutrality, Gender, and Process, 31 LoY. L.A.
L. REV. 513 (1998); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics and the Settlements of Mass Torts:
When the Rules Meet the Road, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1159 (1995); Barbara J. Rothstein et
al., A Model Mass Tort: The PPA Experience, 54 DRAKE L. REV. 621 (2006).
101 See The Resolution Systems Institute, supra note 58.
102 See generally Florida State Courts Alternative Dispute Resolution Program,
http://www.flcourts.org/gen_public/adr/RRindex.shtml (last visited Feb. 7, 2009); see
also New York State Uniform Court System Alternative Dispute Resolution Program,
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/ip/adr/publications.shtml#AnnualReport (last visited Feb.
7, 2009).
103 See James R. Coben & Peter N. Thompson, Disputing Irony: A Systematic Look
at Litigation About Mediation, 11 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 43 (2006).
104 See Lande, supra note 87 (reviewing case law in which courts consider rules
requiring good faith participation in court-connected mediation).
105 Alan Effron, Note, Federalism and Federal Consent Decrees Against State
Governmental Entities, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1796 (1988).
106 Coben & Thompson, supra note 103, at 57-73.
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administrative agencies that are third party DSDs. Thus, labor relations
DSDs both entail their own collective choice rules, and they are nested
within a constitutional government that provides through other collective
choice rules, a legal framework in labor law that enforces their
agreements. 0 7 Participants have the right to self-organize. There is
transparency allowing them to monitor the results of their DSD over time.
Moreover, the disputants themselves can determine whether the costs and
benefits of their system are in balance; they can change their standing
arbitrator panel, or their third party service provider, or determine to adopt a
rule that shifts arbitrator fees to the losing party. Private justice systems in
the diamond'08 and cotton 10 9 industries are robust in Ostrom's sense; they
are enduring, stable, adaptive, participatory, characterized by collective
choice rules in a private democratic membership structure, subject to
monitoring by that membership association, and self-governing.
However, in the past three decades, a new phenomenon has emerged and
flourished. A single disputant with superior economic power has taken
unilateral control over designing a dispute system for conflicts to which it is
a party. Moreover, often they have elected DSDs that effectively restrict
recourse to the public civil justice system through adhesive binding
arbitration clauses."I 0 These DSDs do not have meaningful collective choice
107 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW: THE BOARD, THE CouRTs, AND THE NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS ACT (John E. Higgins, Jr. ed., 5th ed. 2006).
108 Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual
Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115 (1992).
109 Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating
Cooperation Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REv. 1724 (2001).
110 Scott Baker, A Risk-Based Approach to Mandatory Arbitration, 83 OR. L. REV.
861 (2004) (arguing that some employers use mandatory arbitration to manage risk, and
that repeat players should pay more for the privilege); see also Alexander J.S. Colvin,
Institutional Pressures, Human Resource Strategies, and the Rise of Nonunion Dispute
Resolution Procedures, 56 INDUs. & LAB. REL. REV. 375 (2003) (finding that rising
individual rights litigation and increased judicial deferral to nonunion arbitration are
institutional factors leading to increased adoption of mandatory arbitration in the
workplace); Alexander J.S. Colvin, From Supreme Court to Shopfloor: Mandatory
Arbitration and the Reconfiguration of Workplace Dispute Resolution, 13 CORNELL J.L.
& PUB. POL'Y 581 (2004); Stephan Landsman, ADR and the Cost of Compulsion, 57
STAN. L. REV. 1593, 1593 (2005) (arguing that risks of compelled ADR include the
"likelihood that adhesion contract drafters will use arbitration clauses and related
requirements to short-circuit existing legislation with newly drafted provisions protective
of their special interests, that contract drafters will, in some cases, go even further and use
their drafting power to squelch all claims, and that ADR providers will be sorely tempted
to cast their lot with adhesion contract drafters in order to win and retain valuable
business"); Jean R. Stemlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is it Just?, 57 STAN. L.
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rules within the holon that is the arbitration program. "' They are nested in a
legal framework for arbitration; in interstate commerce that is the Federal
Arbitration Act, which is adopted through collective choice rules in a
constitutional form of government, namely our democracy. However, the
degree of personal participation in collective choice at the level of national
government is attenuated."l 2 There are limited or no rights to self-
organization in the context of adhesive arbitration. For example, plans
attempt to prohibit or preclude class action litigation or arbitration. Some
plans prohibit the use of legal counsel, which might otherwise be considered
a form of self-organization or freedom of association. 113 Moreover, there is
limited transparency in adhesive arbitration because awards generally are
confidential unless the parties mutually agree to their publication. 114 Even
where states attempt to regulate arbitration to require reporting of outcomes,
compliance and enforcement are problematic. 115
REv. 1631 (2005) (surveying the emergency of mandatory arbitration in lieu of civil
litigation for employment and consumer claims and concluding that it is unjust).
111 I recognize some scholars would argue that there is consent to form contracts or
adhesive arbitration clauses in personnel manuals because the prospective consumer or
employee can simply walk away. However, when growing numbers of service providers
and employers adopt these practices, there are no meaningful alternatives. Linda J.
Demaine & Deborah R. Hensler, "Volunteering" to Arbitrate Through Predispute
Arbitration Clauses: The Average Consumer's Experience, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
55 (2004).
112 In our representative democracy, participation in the work of the federal
government is limited to voting and public participation through the Administrative
Procedures Act and its amendments, although there is the potential for more civic
engagement through the new governance. See generally Lisa Blomgren Bingham,
Collaborative Governance: Emerging Practices and the Incomplete Legal Framework
for Citizen and Stakeholder Voice, 1 HASTINGS ANNUAL L. REv. (forthcoming 2009).
113 See Walters v. National Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305 (1985)
(holding that there is no First Amendment right to freedom of association with legal
counsel within an administrative proceeding established to support veterans seeking
benefits for injuries).
114 See Lisa Blomgren Bingham, Evaluation Dispute Resolution Programs: Traps
for the Unwary, in LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS ASSOCIATION SERIES
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 59TH ANNUAL MEETING 104 (2007); David B. Lipsky et al.,
Managing the Politics of Evaluation: Lessons from the Evaluation of ADR Programs, in
LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS ASSOCIATION SERIES PROCEEDINGS OF THE 59TH
ANNUAL MEETING 116 (2007).
115 Lisa Blomgren Bingham et al., Arbitration Data Disclosure in California: What
We Have and What We Need. Paper presented at the American Bar Association Section
of Dispute Resolution Conference in Los Angeles, April 2005 (copy on file with author).
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The argument over mandatory arbitration as a DSD imposed on one
party by the other boils down to an argument over some form of distributive
justice. The Supreme Court has enforced this form of arbitration on the
theory that it is a mere substitution of forum, not a change in the substance of
the remedy. 116 As the above discussion shows, there are reasons to believe
this may not be true. Arbitration outcomes may differ systematically from
litigation outcomes. Rigorous empirical research might answer this question.
However, there are obstacles to that research. 117 These obstacles operate as
barriers to improving DSD.
This brief discussion is intended only to illustrate the usefulness of an
empirically tested, theoretically grounded framework for rigorously
116 Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
117 This is a DSD issue, because the designers could provide for disclosure for
purposes of monitoring, a characteristic of robust institutions in Ostrom's LAD
framework. Instead, most mediation and arbitration occurs in the context of an agreement
under which all parties agree to maintain the confidentiality of communications within
the process and usually agree not to disclose its outcome. Mediated settlements and
arbitration awards are unpublished and confidential. In order to obtain access to data,
researchers must demonstrate a willingness to respect that confidentiality, and must
develop data collection plans in collaboration with the source. Mediators are even more
reluctant than arbitrators to introduce an observer into the delicate interpersonal dynamics
of a dispute. The mediator may already be concerned about an imbalance of power
between the disputants, and unwilling to bring another person who is a stranger into the
caucus with either party. Common methods researchers have used to overcome this
problem include: mail and telephone surveys to organizations regarding their dispute
resolution plans or the neutral mediators or arbitrators involved, mail and telephone
surveys with participants in the processes, experimental research in which neutrals
provide data regarding a hypothetical case, and less commonly, examination of archival
case files where available. These methods often present problems due to low response
rate or sample selection bias. For example, selection bias may occur when disputants
have a choice of dispute resolution process, as in many voluntary, court-annexed
programs. Moreover, in mandatory arbitration, all cases from a given corporation or
organization go into arbitration; it is hard to determine whether that organization's cases
are similar to the population of cases found in an administrative agency's or court's
docket. Often, it is not feasible to afford dispute resolution by random assignment;
disputants excluded from one option might not perceive it as fair. Therefore, a researcher
may have samples of participants who use mediation or arbitration and others who do
not, but these categories are not random. It is rarely possible to use a pilot site/control site
method to structure a study, although this approach is certainly desirable in larger
organizations. In order to use a before and after design, the researcher must become
involved with an organization early in its development of a dispute resolution program,
and collect data over a prolonged period of time. Together, these problems operate to
limit what researchers have learned about dispute resolution and the outcomes of various
dispute system designs.
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analyzing how well DSDs function as institutions. In the next generation of
DSD, we need to move beyond arguments over whether a particular design
or model is good or bad based on a priori assumptions and incomplete data.
Once we have a sound empirical basis to judge, we can begin to assess the
nature and quality of justice we have designed and whether the DSD is
effectively delivering it.
III. VARIETIES OF JUSTICE IN LEGAL INSTITUTIONS AND OTHER
SYSTEMS FOR MANAGING CONFLICT
How should we compare civil and criminal 'justice' systems and justice
in ADR? There are a number of arguments that proponents advance to
support both settlement and ADR. Galanter and Cahill (2002) provide the
best catalogue and critique of these arguments in their Table 1:118
TABLE 1: Reasons to Think Settlements Are Good
A. The Party-Preference Arguments
1. Party pursuit: Settlement (rather than adjudication) is what the
parties seek. In other words, they "vote with their feet."
2. Party satisfaction: Settlement leads to greater party satisfaction.
3. Party needs: Settlement is more responsive to the needs or
underlying preferences of parties.
B. The Cost-Reduction Arguments
4. Party savings: Settlement saves the parties time and resources, and
spares them unwanted risk and aggravation.
5. Court efficiency: Settlement saves the courts time and resources,
conserving their scarce resources (especially judicial attention); it
makes courts less congested and better able to serve other cases.
C. The Superior-Outcome Arguments
6. Golden mean: Settlement is superior because it results in a
compromise outcome between the original positions of the parties.
7. Superior knowledge: Settlement is based on superior knowledge
of the facts and the parties' preferences.
8. Normative richness: Settlement is more principled, infused with a
wider range of norms, permitting the actors to use a wider range of
normative concerns.
118 Galanter & Cahill, supra note 8.
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9. Inventiveness: Settlement permits a wider range of outcomes,
greater flexibility in solutions, and admits more inventiveness in
devising remedies.
10. More compliance: Parties are more likely to comply with
dispositions reached by settlement.
11. Personal transformation: The process of settlement qualitatively
changes the participants.
D. Superior General Effects Arguments
12. Deterrence: Information provided by settlements prevents
undesirable behavior by affecting future actors' calculations of the
costs and benefits of conduct.
13. Moral education: Settlements may influence estimations of the
rightness or feasibility of various sorts of behavior.
14. Mobilization and demobilization: By defining the possibilities of
remedial action, settlements may encourage or discourage future
legal actors to make (or resist) other claims.
15. Precedent and patterning: Settlements broadcast signals to
various audiences about legal standards, practices and expectations.
Interestingly, this catalogue does not expressly refer to justice. Instead,
many of the arguments relate to the administration of justice; this is
particularly true of the cost reduction arguments. 119
However, part of the dialogue on dispute resolution revolves around
whether it delivers justice. 120 DSDs exist in some relation to the rule of law.
Professor MacCormack has observed:
119 It is nevertheless possible to use some of these arguments as indicators or
measures of the presence of certain forms of justice. For example, satisfaction measures
are often related to theories of procedural and distributive justice from social psychology.
Superior outcome arguments suggest better distributive or substantive justice. Arguments
for creativity suggest Pareto Optimality as used by Rawls in his theory of justice as
fairness. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 67-69 (1971).
120 Dispute resolution encompasses a number of 'conflict-resolving institutions,' as
that term is used by Kenneth M. Ehrenberg. Ehmeberg, supra note 20. He observes:
As Hume famously noted, justice is not an appropriate standard in situations of
abundance or enlarged affections. Rather, it is a concept that serves as a
criterion by which we resolve conflicts over property distribution, over showing
each other the proper amount of respect, and over the appropriate response to
situations where others have been wronged. These and other conflicts define the
scope of justice. As social constructions or organizations of people that seek to
resolve interpersonal conflicts, conflict-resolving institutions obviously deal
extensively with the concept of justice.
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
Law is necessarily geared to some conception of justice,
taking account of distributive, retributive, and corrective
aspects of justice, to all of which respect for the rule of law
is, in the context of the state's capability for coercion,
essential. It is "necessarily geared" to it in the sense that
anyone engaged in its administration, whether in a
legislative, executive, or judicial capacity, can only be
justified in implementing, amending, or interpreting the
provisions of the system given a certain condition. This is
that they can give grounds for holding that some reasonable
conception of justice is satisfied by the provision in question,
or that it pursues some element of a reasonably assessed
common good in a way that is reasonably coherent with the
relevant conception of justice. 21
There are many different forms, names, definitions, and varieties of
justice depending on context: a sampling includes corrective, substantive,
distributive, social, procedural, organizational, interactional, interpersonal,
communicative, communitarian, restorative, and transitional justices. Even
within this sampling, there are multiple definitions for a given term. For
example, procedural justice has a variety of meanings, depending on whether
you examine the term from the perspective of social psychology or
jurisprudence. 122 Table 2 reflects the current results of my ongoing effort to
collect these varieties of justice.
Table 2. Varieties of Justice
Name Source Definition
Substantive Rawls 123  Distributive Justice
Justice
Distributive Posner citing The state distributes money, honors, and
Justice Aristotle 124  things of value
Distributive Thibaut and Equity theory: An allocation is equitable
Justice Walker 125  when outcomes are proportional to the
contributions of group members
Id. at 169 (citation omitted).
121 NEIL MACCORMICK, INSTITUTIONS OF LAw: AN ESSAY IN LEGAL THEORY 264
(2007).
122 See infra notes 132-37.
123 RAwLS, supra note 119, at 59.
12 4 RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 335 (1990).
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Egalitarian Rawls 26  Distributive justice to allow for
Justice Posner citing compensating undeserved inequalities of
Ackerman 127  birth (affirmative action)
Allocative Rawls 128  When a given collection of goods is to be
Justice divided among definite individuals with
known desires and needs, and the
individuals did not produce the goods,
justice becomes efficiency unless equality
is preferred. Leads to classical utilitarian
view.
Justice as Rawls 129  Inequality justified by improving the
Fairness situation of the least advantaged person in
an ordinal ranking
Justice as Thibaut and Equality or needs based allocation
Fairness Walker 130
Social Justice Posner' 31 Purely public non-compensatory remedy
that views harm as social and not
individual entitlement
Macrojustice Lipsky et Pattern of outcomes from the DSD
al.132
Restitutionary Posner 133  Strict liability; justice as restitution for
Justice harm that one causes, regardless of wrong;
a form of distributive justice
Perfect Rawls 134  Procedure designed to render perfect
Procedural distributive justice, e.g. person who cuts
Justice the cake must take last piece
Pure Procedural Rawls 135  Distributing goods based on random
Justice procedure, as in odds, dice, gambling
125 JOHN THIBAUT & LAURENS WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: A PSYCHOLOGICAL
ANALYSIS 85-94 (1975).
126 RAWLS, supra note 119, at 100.
127 POSNER, supra note 124, at 338.
128 RAWLS, supra note 119, at 88.
129 1d. at 115.
13 0 THIBAUT & WALKER, supra note 125, at 122-124.
131 POSNER, supra note 124, at 335-36.
13 2 DAViD B. LIPSKY ET AL., supra note 48, at 6.
133 POSNER, supra note 124, at 324-27.
134 RAWLS, supra note 119, at 85.
135 Id. at 86.
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Imperfect Rawls 136  Criminal trials; human error
Procedural
Justice
Procedural Thibaut and Satisfaction and perceived fairness in
Justice Walker as allocation disputes are affected
cited by Lind substantially by factors other than whether
and Tyler 137  the individual has won or lost the dispute
Procedural Lind and When procedures are in accord with
Justice Tyler 138  fundamental values of the group and the
individual, a sense of procedural justice
results. Value-expressive function of
voice. People value participation in the life
of their group and their status as members.
Procedural MacCoun 139  Fairness Heuristic Theory: People value
Justice fair procedure as a shortcut to deciding
whether outcome is fair in a position of
uncertainty.
Organizational Folger and Procedural justice in the context of the
Justice Cropanzano 140 workplace and grievance procedures
Interactional Folger and Quality of interpersonal treatment received
Justice Cropanzano 14 1 during the enactment of organizational
procedures, concerns about the fairness of
the non-procedurally dictated aspects of
interaction, including interpersonal justice
and informational
Informational Bies, Shapiro, Explanations about the procedures used to
Justice Colquitt 142  determine outcomes
136 Id. at 85.
137 THIBAUT & WALKER, supra note 125 (as described in E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R.
TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE 7-40 (1988)).
138 LIND & TYLER, supra note 137, at 236.
139 Robert J. MacCoun, Voice, Control, and Belonging: The Double-Edged Sword of
Procedural Fairness, 1 ANN. REv. L. SOC. SCI. 171-201 (2005).
14 0 See generally ROBERT FOLGER & RUSSELL CROPANZANO, ORGANIZATIONAL
JUSTICE AND HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT (1998).
141 Id.
142 See generally Jason A. Colquitt, On the Dimensionality of Organizational
Justice: A Construct Validation of a Measure, 86 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 386, 389-91
(2001)
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Interpersonal Colquitt143  Degree to which people are treated with
Justice politeness, dignity, and respect by
authorities
Microjustice Lipsky et Perceptions ofjustice on a subjective level
al.144
Formal Justice Posner' 45  Reasonable rule, equal treatment, public
justice, procedure to establish facts
Formal Justice Rawls 146  Justice as regularity, treating similar cases
similarly, rule of law in legal institutions,
impartial and consistent administration of
law and institutions.
Personal Justice Posner147  Corruption, judge resolves dispute based
A on his/her personal stake in the dispute as a
parent, investor, or other interested party
Personal Justice Posner148  Judge resolves dispute based on the
B personal characteristics of the disputants
Personal Justice Posner 149  Judge resolves substantive dispute based
C on particulars of case, using general
standard and not rule; ad hoc
Pragmatic Posner 15°  Judges must be allowed to change their
Justice minds, even though the consequence is
arbitrary justice
Retroactive Posner 151  Justice with rules invented after the fact to
Justice address a wrong (Nuremberg)
Corrective Posner citing Rectificatory or commutative justice for
Justice Aristotle 152  transactions; when there is injury and
wrongdoing, a judge equalizes with a
penalty to take away the gain. Assumes an
existing structure of legal rights.
143 Id. at 386-98.
144 LIPsKY ET AL., supra note 48, at 6.
145 POSNER, supra note 124, at 332-34.
146 RAWLS, supra note 119, at 58-59.
147 POSNER, supra note 124, at 318.
148 Id. at 315.
149 Id. at 318-19.
150 Id. at 333.
151 Id. at 332-33.
152 Id. at 312-13.
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Deterrent Posner 153  Punishment for injury and wrongdoing in
Justice order to deter others
Retributive Posner 154  Justice as personal revenge or community
Justice punishment based on moral outrage
Justice in Posner citing Justice as neutrality. Justice flows from
Dialogue Ackerman 155  participation in rational discourse about
political legitimacy
Communicative Posner citing Idealized speech or undistorted
Justice Habermas156  communication
Communitarian Feminist Concern for other people [community], not
Justice Jurisprudence simply respect for others [individual]
157
Utilitarian Rawls 158  Greatest happiness for the greatest number
Justice
Restorative Wachtel and Through atonement, forgiveness, and
Justice McCold 159  compassion, restorative justice promotes
Umbreit et reconciliation between victim and offender
al. 160  and seeks to reintegrate the offender into
the community
Transitional Teitel16I Using rule of law as a way to reconstitute
Justice the collective-across potentially divisive
racial, ethnic, and religious lines
Justice in Civil Posner 162  Compliance impossible and futility felt as
Disobedience injustice
Injustice Rawls 163  Inequalities not to the benefit of all
153 POSNER, supra note 124, at 329-30.
154 Id. at 330.
155 Id. at 336.
156 Id.
15 7 See generally NANCY LEVIT & ROBERT R.M. VERCI!CK, FEMINIST LEGAL
THEORY: A PRIMER (2006).
158 RAWLS, supra note 119, at 89.
159 Ted Wachtel & Paul McCold, Restorative Justice in Everyday Life, in
RESTORATIVE JUSTICE IN CIvIL SOCIETY 114, 114-29 (Heather Strang & John Braithwaite
eds., 2001).
16 0 See generally MARK S. UMBREIT, VICTIM MEETS OFFENDER: THE IMPACT OF
RESTORATIVE JUSTICE AND MEDIATION (1994).
161 TEITEL, supra note 39, at 213-30.
162 POSNER, supra note 124, at 334.
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It is important for aspiring dispute system designers to recognize that these
varieties of justice exist. Not all DSDs can produce as outcomes all forms of
justice. Some forms of justice are mutually exclusive while others are
reconcilable. For example, it is possible to envision a system that provides
distributive justice on some definition but does not result in social justice. In
the following discussion, I will briefly survey varieties of justice and provide
examples of DSDs that illustrate or are relevant to that variety of justice. I
hope that this is the beginning of a broader discussion; it is not a
comprehensive treatment of the subject.
A. Outcomes: Substantive, Distributive, Allocative, Utilitarian, and
Social Justice
In dispute resolution, the terms substantive and distributive justice tend
to be used interchangeably to reflect the justice of an outcome produced by a
decision process. Posner characterizes Aristotle's concept of distributive
justice as being produced when the state distributes money, honors, and other
things of value. 164 Rawls distinguishes between substantive justice, reflected
in the assignment of fundamental rights and duties and the division of
advantages from social cooperation, 165 and formal justice, which is regularity
of process. 166 However, substantive justice is also related to social justice.
Rawls describes social justice as encompassing the basic structures of society
and arrangement of major social institutions into one scheme of
cooperation. 167 In order to understand the substantive justice produced by a
DSD, one must then examine the underlying substantive law defining rights
and obligations. For example, employment-at-will is a rule of law that shapes
the substantive justice of a DSD involving adhesive arbitration.
Distributive justice generally pertains to the distribution of outcomes in a
society or within that microcosm of society which is a justice system. Rawls
refers to it in connection with the distribution of advantages in a society. 168
He describes a form of distributive justice as allocative justice that occurs
when a given collection of goods is to be divided among definite individuals
with known desires and needs, and the individuals did not produce the
163 RAWLS, supra note 119, at 62.
164 POSNER, supra note 124, at 313.
165 RAWLS, supra note 119, at 58.
166 Id. at 59.
16 7 Id. at54.
168 Id. at 88.
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goods.169 He observes that justice becomes efficiency unless equality is
preferred, and that this view of distributive justice is related to classical
utilitarianism. 170 In this sense, it relates to macrojustice, which is the pattern
of outcomes produced by an institution, system, or DSD.171 Rawls argues for
a form of distributive justice that is "justice as fairness."'172 Starting from a
social system of equal citizenship and varying levels of income and wealth,
he argues for a form of distributive justice in which inequality is only
justified by improving the situation of the least advantaged person in an
ordinal ranking in a situation where no one knows whether he or she will be
the least advantaged person.173
In social science, distributive justice has roots in social equity theory. 17 4
It posits that social behavior occurs in response to the distribution of
outcomes. Distributive justice emphasizes fairness in the allocation of
outcomes. An allocation is equitable when outcomes are proportional to the
contributions of group members. 175 Thus, in mediation research, distributive
justice suggests that satisfaction is a function of outcome, specifically the
fact and content of a settlement or resolution. In theory, participants are more
satisfied when they believe that the settlement is fair and favorable. There is
a substantial body of empirical research that supports the distributive justice
model as an explanation of satisfaction. 176 The research suggests that
distributive justice is a better explanation for satisfaction related to conflicts
over resource allocation (such as wage disputes) than other cases in which
fairness matters.
Related to distributive justice are arguments for particular distributions in
light of fairness. For example, egalitarian justice entails compensating people
169 Id.
170 Id.
171 This term has found use in social psychology and philosophy. See SERGE-
CHRIsTOPHE KOLM, MACROJUSTICE: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF FAIRNESS (2005).
172 See also Jonathan M. Hyman, Swimming in the Deep End: Dealing with Justice
in Mediation, 6 CARDOzO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 19-20 (2004) (arguing for a common sense
notion of fairness as the guide for mediators to think about justice in mediation).
173 RAWLS, supra note 119, at 87-90.
174 This discussion of justice in social psychology and organizational behavior is
drawn from Lisa Blomgren Bingham, When We Hold No Truths to be Self-Evident:
Truth, Belief Trust, and the Decline in Trials, 2006 J. DIsp. REsOL. 131, 131 (2006).
175 THIBAUT & WALKER, supra note 125, at 85-94.
176 See DEAN G. PRurrr, NEGOTIATION BEHAVIOR (1981); HOWARD RAIFFA, THE
ART AND SCIENCE OF NEGOTIATION (1982); JEFFREY Z. RUBIN & BERT R. BROWN, THE
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF BARGAINING AND NEGOTIATION (1975).
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for undeserved.inequalities, for example by reason of birth.177 One example
includes consent decree DSDs providing for affirmative action to compensate
for historic discrimination based on race, ethnicity, or gender. One might also
view DSDs providing for classwide reparations in this light.178 Restitutionary
justice imposes strict liability as restitution for harm that one causes,
regardless of wrong. It too is a form of distributive justice justified on public
policy grounds to reduce risk of harm. 179
B. Procedural Justice
Procedural justice has multiple definitions. Within the fields of
philosophy and jurisprudence, it tends to refer to a method of arriving at
distributive justice. Within social psychology and organizational behavior, it
refers to individual participant perceptions of fairness of the processes used
in resolving conflict. For example, Rawls discusses perfect procedural
justice, pure procedural justice, and imperfect procedural justice. Perfect
procedural justice is a procedure designed to render perfect distributive
justice, for example the rule that the person who cuts the cake must take last
piece. 180 Pure procedural justice entails distributing goods based on random
procedure such as odds, dice, or gambling. 181 In contrast, imperfect
procedural justice refers to the inevitable human error factor in trials, for
example the problem of false convictions of innocent people in criminal
trials. 182 Recently Professor Solum examined procedural justice from the
perspective of what makes a procedure legitimate, and posited two
fundamental principles: participation and accuracy. 183 Procedural justice in
177 RAWLS, supra note 119, at 100; POSNER, supra note 124, at 318.
178 See, e.g., Bradford, supra note 42 (describing the argument for reparations for
Native Americans).
179 POSNER, supra note 124, at 324-27.
180 RAWLS, supra note 119, at 85.
181 Id. Professor Stulberg argues that it is possible for mediation, properly designed,
to represent another process for "pure procedural justice." Joseph B. Stulberg, Mediation
and Justice: What Standards Govern?, 6 CARDOZo J. CONFLICT RESOL. 213, 214-15
(2005).
182 RAWLS, supra note 119, at 85.
183 Lawrence B. Solum, Procedural Justice, 78 S. CAL. L. REv. 181, 192-224 (2004)
(examining case law and observing that procedural rules may have intentionally
substantive functions or action guiding for litigation-related conduct, and that substantive
rules may serve procedural functions, such as rules regarding obstruction of justice or
particularized decision making as in motions for summary judgment).
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this sense of due process has been used to evaluate the World Trade
Organization Dispute Settlement Procedure.184
In contrast, social psychologists and socio-legal scholars have developed
theories of distributive, procedural, and interactional justice in contexts
ranging from the courts185 to the workplace based on participant perceptions
of fairness and their satisfaction with various processes. Justice theory in
social science examines perceptions of fairness in, and satisfaction with, the
process and outcome of institutions to resolve conflict. Procedural justice
refers to participants' perceptions about the fairness of the rules and
procedures that regulate a process.1 86 Thibaut and Walker argued that
satisfaction and perceived fairness in allocation disputes are affected
substantially by factors other than whether the individual has won or lost the
dispute. 187 In contrast to distributive justice, which suggests that satisfaction
is a function of outcome (the content of the decision or resolution),
procedural justice suggests that satisfaction is a function of the process (the
steps taken to reach that decision). Tyler and Lind theorized that when
procedures are in accord with the fundamental values of the group and the
individual, a sense of procedural justice results due to the value-expressive
function of voice; 188 people value participation in the life of their group and
their status as members.
Among the traditional principles of procedural justice are impartiality,
voice or opportunity to be heard, and grounds for decisions. 189 Procedural
issues such as neutrality of the process and decisionmaker, 190 treatment of
184 John P. Gaffney, Due Process in the World Trade Organization: The Need for
Procedural Justice in the Dispute Settlement System, 14 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 1173,
1195-1221(1999).
185 For excellent syntheses of the procedural justice literature as applied to court-
connected dispute resolution, see Donna Shestowsky, Disputants'Preferences for Court-
Connected Dispute Resolution Procedures: Why We Should Care and Why We Know So
Little, 23 OHIO ST. J. DisP. RESOL. 549 (2008) and Donna Shestowsky, Misjudging:
Implications for Dispute Resolution, 7 NEV. L.J. 487 (2007).
186 WILLIAM G. AUSTIN & JOYCE M. TOBIASEN, Legal Justice and the Psychology of
Conflict Resolution, in THE SENSE OF INJUSTICE: SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES
(R. Folger ed., 1984); THIBAUT & WALKER, supra note 125, at 1-5.
187 THJBAUT & WALKER, supra note 125, at 117-22.
188 LIND & TYLER, supra note 137, at 230-37.
18 9 MICHAEL D. BAYLES, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: ALLOCATING TO INDIVIDUALS 19-
85 (1990).
190 Tom R Tyler & E. Allan Lind, A Relational Model ofAuthority in Groups, in 25
ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 115-92 (Mark P. Zanna ed., 1992)
[hereinafter Tyler, Relational Model].
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the participants with dignity and respect, 191 and the trustworthiness of the
decisionmaking authority 192 are important to enhancing perceptions of
procedural justice. Extensive literature supports procedural justice theories of
satisfaction in a variety of contexts involving both courts and dispute
resolution. 193 In general, research suggests that if organizational processes
and procedures are perceived to be fair, participants will be more satisfied,
more willing to accept the resolution of that procedure, and more likely to
form positive attitudes about the organization. 194 Procedural justice has been
used to examine DSDs involving courts, 195 special education, 196 domestic
violence, 197 the 9/11 Victim Compensation Fund, 198 criminal sentencing, 199
and police and citizen interactions, 200 to name but a few examples.
C. Organizational Justice: Interactional, Informational, and
Interpersonal Justice
Beginning in the 1980s, organizational justice researchers developed the
notion of interactional justice, defined as the quality of interpersonal
treatment received during the enactment of organizational procedures. 20' In
general, interactional justice reflects concerns about the fairness of the non-
191 Robert J. Bies & Joseph S. Moag, Interactional Justice: Communication Criteria
of Fairness, in 1 RESEARCH ON NEGOTIATION IN ORGANIZATIONS, 43-55 (R. J. Lewicki et
al. eds., 1986) [hereinafter Bies, Interactional Justice]; LIND & TYLER, supra note 137.
192 Tyler, Relational Model, supra note 190.
193 LIND & TYLER, supra note 137; E. Allan Lind et al., In the Eye of the Beholder.-
Tort Litigants' Evaluations of Their Experience in the Civil Justice System, 24 LAW &
Soc'Y REv. 953 (1990).
194 LIND & TYLER, supra note 137; Tyler, Relational Model, supra note 190.
195 Donna Shestowsky, Disputants' Perceptions of Dispute Resolution Procedures:
An Ex Ante and Ex Poste Longitudinal Empirical Study, 41 CONN. L. REv. 63 (2008).
196 Nancy A. Welsh, Stepping Back Through the Looking Glass: Real Conversations
with Real Disputants About Institutionalized Mediation and its Value, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON
DisP. RESOL. 573 (2004).
197 Deborah Epstein, Procedural Justice: Tempering the State's Response to
Domestic Violence, 43 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1843 (2002).
198 Tracy Hresko, Restoration and Relief- Procedural Justice and the September
11th Victim Compensation Fund, 42 GONZ. L. REv. 95 (2007).
199 Adam Lamparello, Social Psychology, Legitimacy, and the Ethical Foundations
of Judgment: Importing the Procedural Justice Model to Federal Sentencing
Jurisprudence, 38 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REv. 115 (2006).
200 Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice, Legitimacy, and the Effective Rule of Law, 30
CRIME & JUSTICE: A REViEw OF RESEARCH 283 (Michael Tonry ed., 2003).
201 Bies, Interactional Justice, supra note 191, at 44.
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procedurally dictated aspects of interaction. 20 2 Research has identified two
components of interactional justice: interpersonal justice and informational
justice.20 3 These two components overlap considerably. However, empirical
research suggests that they should be considered separately as each has
differential and independent effects upon perceptions ofjustice.204
Informational justice focuses on the enactment of decisionmaking
procedures. Research suggests that explanations about the procedures used to
determine outcomes enhance perceptions of informational justice.20 5
Explanations provide the information needed to evaluate the structural
aspects of the process and how it is enacted.20 6 However, for explanations to
be perceived as fair they must be recognized as sincere and communicated
without ulterior motives,20 7 be based on sound reasoning with logically
202 See Russell Korobkin, Psychological Impediments to Mediation Success: Theory
and Practice, 21 OHIO ST. J. ON DiSP. RESOL. 281 (2006) (discussing how interactional
justice interacts with psychological biases that create impediments to settlement).
203 ROBERT G. FOLGER & RUSSELL CROPANZANO, ORGANIZATIONAL JUSTICE AND
HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT (Sage Publication 1998); Tom Tyler & Robert J. Bies,
Beyond Formal Procedures: The Interpersonal Context of Procedural Justice, in
APPLIED SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY AND ORGANIZATIONAL SETTINGS 77-98 (J. Carroll ed.,
1990) [hereinafter Bies, Formal Procedures].
204 Jason A. Colquitt, On the Dimensionality of Organizational Justice: A Construct
Validation of a Measure, 86 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 386, 386-400 (2001); Jason A. Colquitt
et al., Justice at the Millennium: A Meta-Analytic Review of 25 Years of Organizational
Justice Research, 86 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 425, 425-45 (2001) [hereinafter Colquitt et al.,
Millennium].
205 Robert J. Bies, The Predicament of Injustice: The Management of Moral
Outrage, in 9 RESEARCH IN ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR 289, 289-319 (L. Cummings &
B. M. Staw eds., 1987); Robert J. Bies, & Debra L. Shapiro, Voice and Justification:
Their Influence on Procedural Fairness Judgments, 31 ACAD. MGMT. J. 676, 676-85
(1988); Jerald Greenberg, Organizational Justice: Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow, 16
J. MGMT 399, 399-432 (1990); Debra L. Shapiro, Reconciling Theoretical Differences
Among Procedural Justice Researchers by Re-Evaluating What it Means to Have One's
Views "Considered": Implications for Third-Party Managers, in JUSTICE IN THE
WORKPLACE: APPROACHING FAIRNESS IN HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 51, 51-78
(Russell Cropanzano ed., 1993); Bies, Formal Procedures, supra note 203, at 77-98.
206 Colquitt et al., Millennium, supra note 204; Jerald Greenberg, The Social Side of
Fairness: Interpersonal and Informational Classes of Organizational Justice, in JUSTICE
IN THE WORKPLACE: APPROACHING FAIRNESS IN HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 79
(Russell Cropanzano ed., 1993) [hereinafter Greenberg, Social Side]; Jerald Greenberg,
Using Socially Fair Treatment to Promote Acceptance of a Work Site Smoking Ban, 79 J.
APPLIED PSYCHOL. 288, 288-97 (1994) [hereinafter Greenberg, Smoking Ban].
207 Robert J Bies et al., Causal Accounts and Managing Organizational Conflict: Is
It Enough to Say It's Not My Fault?, 15 COMM. REs. 381, 381-99 (1988).
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relevant information, 208 and be determined by legitimate rather than arbitrary
factors.209
Interpersonal justice reflects the degree to which people are treated with
politeness, dignity, and respect by authorities. The experience of
interpersonal justice can alter reactions to decisions, because sensitivity can
make people feel better about an unfavorable outcome.210 Interpersonal
treatment includes interpersonal communication,211 truthfulness, respect,
propriety of questions, justification,212 honesty, courtesy, timely feedback,
and respect for rights.213
Three psychological models explain these research results: control
theory,214 group value theory,215 and fairness heuristic theory.216 Control
theory is related to social-exchange theory and posits that decision control
allows disputants to shape the final outcome while process control allows
them to present evidence and arguments that will in turn affect outcome.217
Group value theory suggests that people value fair process (neutrality and
respectful, dignified treatment) because it signals their value and standing
within a social group.218 In early models, the trustworthiness of the third
party authority was an element of perceived fairness. 219 Most recently,
fairness heuristic theory suggests that people use information about
208 Debra L. Shapiro & H. B. Buttner, Adequate Explanations: What are They, and
Do They Enhance Procedural Justice Under Severe Outcome Circumstances? (Paper
presented at the annual meeting of the Academy of Management, Anaheim, CA., 1988).
209 Robert Folger et al., Relative Deprivation and Procedural Justifications, 45 J.
PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL., 268, 268-73 (1983).
210 Colquitt et al., Millennium, supra note 204; Greenberg, Social Side, supra note
206; Greenberg, Smoking Ban, supra note 206.
211 Bies, Interactional Justice, supra note 191.
212 Id.
213 Id.
214 THmAUT AND WALKER, supra note 125.
215 Tom R. Tyler, The Psychology of Procedural Justice: A Test of the Group-Value
Model, 57 J. OF PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 830 (1989) [hereinafter Tyler, Group
Value Model].
216 Kees van den Bos & E. Allan Lind, Uncertainty Management by Means of
Fairness Judgments, 34 ADVANCES IN Exp. SOC. PSYCHOL. I (Mark P. Zanna ed., 2002).
For a review of the literature, see Robert J. MacCoun, supra note 139, 171-201.
217 MacCoun, supra note 139.
218 Tyler, Relational Model, supra note 190.
219 Tyler, Group Value Model, supra note 215, at 831.
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perceptions of fair outcome or fair process as a shortcut, or heuristic, in
deciding whether an authority can be trusted.220
Procedural justice and its cousin organizational justice are the primary
frames through which DSDs are evaluated and judged in the literature. Most
studies take the form of comparative subjective judgments of fairness and
satisfaction based on interviews or surveys of participants and their
representatives. 221 Most evaluation research does not directly ask participants
to evaluate justice. The dependent variables simply permit researchers to
assess which of two or more dispute processes are judged to be fairer or to
produce higher satisfaction with process or outcome. This is a useful body of
work. However, it is limited in that it is inherently a portrait of collective
subjective perceptions. It does not address the question of the actual,
objective outcome of a DSD. Some authors have termed the forms of justice
based on individual perceptions as "microjustice. ' 222
D. Community and Justice: Corrective, Retributive, Deterrent,
Restorative, Transitional, Communitarian, and Communicative
Justice
All varieties of justice are ultimately about humans functioning in a
community in relation to each other. Posner describes Aristotle's corrective
justice as a form of substantive justice that is rectificatory or commutative
justice in connection with a transaction in which there is injury and
wrongdoing. 223 Judges engage in corrective justice when they issue penalties
to take away gains and restore equality.224 Corrective justice assumes an
220 Kees van den Bos, Uncertainty Management: The Influence of Uncertainty
Salience on Reactions to Perceived Procedural Fairness, 80 J. OF PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 931 (2001); see also MacCoun, supra note 139.
221 See e.g., E. Allan Lind et al., In the Eye of the Beholder: Tort Litigants'
Evaluations of Their Experiences in the Civil Justice System, 24 LAW & SOC'Y REv. 953
(1990)..
222 LIPSKY ET AL., supra note 48.
223 POSNER, supra note 124, at 313-14.
224 Steven Walt, Eliminating Corrective Justice, 92 VA. L. REv. 1311, 1311 (2006)
describing the arguments over the relationship between distributive and corrective justice:
Distributive justice describes the morally required distribution of shares of
resources and liberty among people. Corrective justice describes the moral
obligation of repair: the person morally responsible for wrongfully harming another
has a duty to compensate the person harmed. A question arises about the relationship
between distributive and corrective justice. The contemporary debate usually puts
the matter in terms of normative priority or independence. Distributive justice is
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existing structure of legal rights and is useful for both tort22 5 and criminal
justice.
Criminal justice gives us two theories that are cousins of corrective
justice:226 deterrent and retributive justice. Deterrence rests on the notion that
severe penalties are justified if they reduce the overall incidence of crime.227
Retributive justice is related to justice as vengeance or punishment by society
in lieu of individual vengeance, and applies to both criminal and tort law. 228
DSDs in criminal law229 include the institutionalization of plea bargaining in
the shadow of the criminal trial.230
A leading response to both deterrence and retribution is restorative
justice. 23 1 Drawing on religious traditions advocating atonement,
forgiveness, and compassion,232 restorative justice seeks to promote
reconciliation between victim and offender and to reintegrate the offender
into the community.2 33 Braithwaite observes that "restorative justice requires
normatively prior to corrective justice if corrective justice is merely instrumental to
the fulfillment of distributive justice's demands. Corrective justice is normatively
prior if there is an obligation of repair even when an unjust distribution of holdings
is wrongfully disturbed. And corrective and distributive justice are normatively
independent if an obligation of repair applies without regard to satisfaction of the
demands of distributive justice.
Id. (citation omitted).
225 See, e.g., Malin, supra note 90 (characterizing the tort of retaliatory discharge
based on public policy as a judicial exercise in distributive justice better left to
legislatures and the tort of abusive discharge as an exercise in corrective justice the courts
have overlooked); Christopher H. Schroeder, Corrective Justice and Liability for
Increasing Risks, 37 UCLA L. REv. 439 (1990) (arguing for tort liability for increasing
risk whether or not harm occurs based on corrective justice).
226 POSNER, supra note 124, at 329.
227 Id. at 330.
228 Id. at 330-31.
229 See Michael M. O'Hear & Andrea Kupfer Schneider, Dispute Resolution in
Criminal Law, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 1 (2007).
230 Michael M. O'Hear, Plea Bargaining and Procedural Justice, 42 GA. L. REv.
407, 409 n. 1 (2007) (observing that 95% of convictions are obtained by way of guilty plea
and arguing for enhanced procedural justice in plea bargaining).
231 JOHN BRAITHwATE, RESTORATIVE JUSTICE & RESPONSIVE REGULATION (2001)
(arguing against punitive justice and in favor of a system that restores victims, offenders,
and communities through atonement, forgiveness, and compassion, and arguing for
deterrence after restorative justice fails).
232 Id. at 1.
233 Erik Luna, Punishment Theory, Holism, and the Procedural Conception of
Restorative Justice, 2003 UTAH L. REv. 205, 228 (2003) (discussing theories of justice in
criminal law).
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us to think holistically about legal justice and social justice rather than to
regard legal justice and social justice as quite separate things, best delivered
by separate institutions (say, the criminal justice system for legal justice, the
welfare system for social justice). '234 DSDs entailing restorative justice
include "victim-offender mediation, family group conferencing,
peacemaking circles, community reparative boards, and victim impact
panels." 235
Transitional justice is a term that has arisen to describe the process of
establishing rule of law and democracy in a post-conflict society. 236 It
includes a variety of DSDs for different purposes. For example, it moves
beyond traditional criminal process to promote national reconciliation using
historical inquiries, 237 reparations, selective justice or prosecution, 238
amnesties, administrative measures to redistribute power, and constitutional
reform.239 The goal is to help the community "to reconstitute the collective-
across potentially divisive racial, ethnic, and religious lines. '240 There is
growing literature on DSDs for the purpose of transitional justice in the form
of truth and reconciliation commissions; 241 the leading example is South
234 John Braithwaite, Holism, Justice, and Atonement, 2003 UTAH L. REv. 389, 391
(2003).
235 Cynthia Alkon, The Increased Use of "Reconciliation" in Criminal Cases in
Central Asia: A Sign of Restorative Justice, Reform or Cause for Concern? 8 PEPP. DIsP.
RESOL. L.J. 41, 67 (2007) (citations omitted); See also, Mark S. Umbreit et al., Victim-
Offender Mediation: Three Decades of Practice and Resarch, 22 CONFLICT RES. Q. 279,
297 (2004) (describing evaluation studies of victim-offender mediation); Howard Zehr,
Commentary, Restorative Justice: Beyond Victim-Offender Mediation, 22 CONFLICT RES.
Q. 305 (2004) (describing other models of restorative justice, including family group
conferences and peacemaking circles).
236 See, e.g., POST-CONFLICT JUSTICE, INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW
SERIES (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 2002).
237 Carrie J. Menkel-Meadow, Remembrance of Things Past? The Relationship of
Past to Future in Pursuing Justice in Mediation, 5 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 97
(2004).
238 David Gray, An Excuse-Centered Approach to Transitional Justice, 74 FORDHAM
L. REv. 2621 (2006) (arguing against retroactive prosecution to punish pre-transition
abusers on the theory that deterrence would fail for those living under an abusive regime
and inconsistent with truth and reconciliation commission institutional designs).
239 TEITEL, supra note 39, at 6.
240 Id. at 225.
241 For a comprehensive and ongoing list of truth and reconciliation commissions in
countries other than the United States, see The United States Institute of Peace,
http://www.usip.org/library/truth.html (last visited Feb. 7, 2009).
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Africa.242 The first United States TRC was in Greensboro, North Carolina. 243
These DSDs also include courts established after genocide in Rwanda.244
Some argue that these DSDs do not yet effectively address the specific harm
of sexual violence against women during conflict. 245
Another conception of justice involves dialogue and communication.
Bruce Ackerman argues we can arrive at distributive justice through a
dialogic process involving neutrality and participation in rational discourse
about political legitimacy.246 Habermas describes communicative justice as
idealized speech or undistorted communication. 247 These ideas are reflected
in upstream DSDs involving deliberative democracy and public policy
dispute resolution in legislative and quasi-legislative activity to identify
preferences, set priorities, and make policy-choices. 248 The notions of
communicative and dialogic justice and restorative justice share the central
concept of discourse as a process for arriving at just outcomes. 249 Authors
advocate communicative justice through discourse as a means of self-
242 For reports and other materials, see the Truth and Reconciliation Commission,
http://www.doj.gov.za/trc/ (last visited Feb. 7, 2009).
243 For a final report, see the Greensboro Truth and Reconciliation Commission,
http://greensborotrc.org (last visited Feb. 7, 2009).
244 Phil Clark, Hybridity, Holism, and "Traditional" Justice: The Case of the
Gacaca Courts in Post-Genocide Rwanda, 39 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 765 (2007);
Maya Goldstein Bolocan, Rwandan Gacaca: An Experiment in Transitional Justice, 2004
J. Disp. RESOL. 355 (2004).
245 Phyllis E. Bernard, Begging for Justice? Or, Adaptive Jurisprudence? Initial
Reflections on Mandatory ADR to Enforce Women's Rights in Rwanda, 7 CARDOZO J.
CONFLICT RESOL. 325 (2006); Naomi R. Cahn, Women in Post-Conflict Reconstruction:
Dilemmas and Directions, 12 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 335 (2006) (discussing the
relationship between violence against women and the DSDs of truth and reconciliation
commissions and noting DSD innovations in the International Criminal Court, itself a
form of DSD); Christine M. Chinkin, Editorial Comment, Women's International
Tribunal on Japanese Military Sexual Slavery, 95 AM.J. INT'L. L. 335 (2001). These
studies can be understood in Ostrom's framework as analyzing DSD from the standpoint
of the position of the victim and her specific characteristic of gender.
246 POSNER, supra note 124, at 336.
247 Id. at 338.
248 Lisa Blomgren Bingham, supra note 112; see also THE DELIBERATIVE
DEMOCRACY HANDBOOK: STRATEGIES FOR EFFECTIVE CIVIC ENGAGEMENT IN THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (John Gastil & Peter Levine eds., 2005).
249 See, e.g., Bruce P. Archibald, Q.C., Let my People Go: Human Capital
Investment and Community Capacity Building Via Meta/Regulation in a Deliberative
Democracy--A Modest Contribution to Criminal Law and Restorative Justice, 16
CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1 (2008).
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determination and democracy. 250 Professor Menkel-Meadow advocates it as
a means for strengthening DSDs involving various forms of dispute
resolution.251
E. Formal Justice, Personal Justice, and Injustice
There are also varieties of justice that represent justice systems
functioning efficiently or inefficiently, fairly or unfairly. These provide a
lens through which to examine dysfunction in DSD. They include formal
justice, personal justice, and injustice.
Formal justice has two different definitions. Posner suggests it entails a
reasonable rule, equal treatment, public justice, and a procedure to establish
the facts. 252 Essentially, Professor Hensler's critique of court-connected
mediation amounts to an observation that it lacks sufficient formal justice
because it fails to provide an adequate fact and law-based process.253 Rawls
describes formal justice as regularity, treating similar cases similarly,
implementing the rule of law in legal institutions, and impartial and
consistent administration of law and institutions. 254 By definition, dispute
resolution processes such as mediation and most commercial arbitration do
not create rules of law or binding precedent. Due to rules on confidentiality,
250 Russell A. Miller, Collective Discursive Democracy as the Indigenous Right to
Self-Determination, 31 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 341, 362 (2007) (discussing discursive
democracy as a system).
251 Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Trouble with the Adversary System in a
Postmodern, Multicultural World, 38 WM. & MARY L. REv. 5 (1996).
252 POSNER, supra note 124, at 332.
253 Hensler, supra note 70, at 96-97. Hensler observes:
In their enthusiasm for helping people resolve their disputes in a less conflict-
oriented fashion, I worry that courts may erode their legitimacy. In most trial courts
today, there are few trials. In many trial courts, parties are required to mediate; in a
growing number of appellate courts, litigants are urged to do likewise. Anecdotal
evidence suggests that in order to persuade parties to accept a settlement many
mediators paint trials in the most negative light possible.... I think we need to think
harder about what we are giving up in the effort to persuade people to choose
conciliation over litigation, we need to think more carefully about what constitutes
fair alternative dispute resolution procedures, and we need to rethink the role of fact-
and law-based dispute resolution in the courts.
ld; Chris Guthrie, Procedural Justice Research and the Paucity of Trials, 2002
J. DIsP. REsOL. 127 (2002) (arguing that the appropriate comparison is not
between mediation and trials, but between mediation and the litigation process,
which usually does not result in a trial).
254 RAwLs, supra note 119, at 58-59.
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it is difficult to determine whether similar cases have similar outcomes in
mediation and arbitration. There is a limited notion of persuasive precedent
in certain forms, such as labor arbitration of grievances and rights, but this
precedent is generally not binding on other arbitrators. 255
Personal justice can take three forms. First, Posner suggests it entails
corruption, in which a judge resolves a dispute based on his or her personal
stake in the "dispute as a parent, investor, or other interested party. '256
Studies of mandatory arbitration based on the repeat player status of
employers and corporations explore whether the economic incentive to
obtain repeat business from the party in a position to refer future cases to the
neutral amounts to a corrupting bias.257 A second form entails a judge who
255 See ELKOURI & ELKOURI: How ARBITRATION WORKS (Alan Miles Ruben ed.,
6th ed. 2003).
256 POSNER, supra note 124, at 317.
257 See generally Lisa B. Bingham, Is There a Bias in Arbitration of Nonunion
Employment Disputes? An Analysis of Actual Cases and Outcomes, 6 INT'L. J. CONFLICT
MGMT. 369 (1995) (finding that employers did not have better outcomes based on
whether arbitrator is compensated or works pro bono); Lisa B. Bingham, Emerging Due
Process Concerns in Employment Arbitration: A Look at Actual Cases, 47 LAB. L. J. 108
(1996) (raising concerns about repeat player outcomes); Lisa B. Bingham, Employment
Arbitration: The Repeat Player Effect, 1 EMP. RTs. & EMP. POL'Y J. 189 (1997) (finding
that employers that arbitrate more than once in the case sample have statistically
significantly higher win rates in employment arbitration); Lisa B. Bingham, On Repeat
Players, Adhesive Contracts, and the Use of Statistics in Judicial Review of Arbitration
Awards, 29 MCGEORGE L. REV. 223 (1998) (replicating empirical analysis of repeat
player effect); Lisa B. Bingham & Shimon Sarraf, Employment Arbitration Before and
After the Due Process Protocol for Mediation and Arbitration of Statutory Disputes
Arising out of Employment. Preliminary Evidence that Self-Regulation Makes a
Difference, in ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN THE EMPLOYMENT ARENA:
PROCEEDINGS OF NEW YORK UNIVERSITY 53RD ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR, 303
(Samuel Estreicher & David Sherwyn, eds., 2004) (finding that implementation of Due
Process Protocol improves employee outcomes); see also Elizabeth Hill, Due Process at
Low Cost: An Empirical Study of Employment Arbitration Under the Auspices of the
American Arbitration Association, 18 OHIO. ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 777 (2003) (proposing
alternative explanations for the repeat player effect based on organizational learning and
an appellate effect); David S. Sherwyn et al., In Defense of Mandatory Arbitration of
Employment Disputes: Saving the Baby, Tossing out the Bath Water, and Constructing a
New Sink in the Process, 2 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 73 (1999) (critiquing method used to
determine repeat player status in Bingham studies); David Sherwyn et al., Assessing the
Case for Employment Arbitration: A New Path for Empirical Research, 57 STAN. L. REV.
1557 (2005) (exploring a variety of hypotheses for the repeat player effect, including:
(1) [A]n employer will choose an arbitrator who found for the company because it
perceives the arbitrator as being proemployer, (2) employers will choose an
arbitrator who found against the company because they believe the arbitrator will
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resolves a dispute based on the personal characteristics of the disputants. 258
Studies of gender259 or racial 260 differences in dispute resolution outcomes
explore this form of personal justice.
Lastly, the judge can resolve the substantive dispute ad hoc based on the
particulars of the case using a general standard and not a specific rule. 261
This is actually one of the arguments proponents use to advocate for dispute
resolution; it allows the parties to craft a form of justice (arbitration) or a
specific outcome (mediation) that suits their specific needs and context.
Proponents of mediation and interest-based negotiation argue that it permits
creativity not available in courts. A related concept is pragmatic justice in
which judges must be allowed to change their minds, even though the
consequence is arbitrary justice.262
And then there is injustice, which Rawls defines as inequalities "not to
the benefit of all."'263
IV. DESIGNING JUSTICE
Lawyers and dispute system designers are effectively designing justice.
However, we need to be systematic in our approach to institutional design in
conflict resolution. We need to build a body of knowledge based on common
categories and shared meaning through which to assess empirically the way
not find against their companies twice, (3) arbitrators will find against the same
company twice, (4) arbitrators will not find against the same company twice, and (5)
any effect of a repeat arbitrator is explained by the existence or absence of a DRP
policy.
Id. at 1571.)
258 POSNER, supra note 124, at 317.
259 See, e.g., Debra J. Mesch, Arbitration and Gender. An Analysis of Cases Taken
to Arbitration in the Public Sector, 24 J. COLLECTIVE NEGOT. PUB. SECTOR 207 (1995)
(suggesting that women charged with felonies are treated more leniently than men);
Elizabeth A. Hoffmann, Dispute Resolution in a Worker Cooperative: Formal
Procedures and Procedural Justice, 39 LAw & Soc'Y REv. 51 (2005) (finding that a
cooperative setting empowered men and women to use different approaches to conflict,
with men using informal processes and women choosing formal ones); see also Lisa B.
Bingham & Debra J. Mesch, Decision Making in Employment and Labor Arbitration, 39
INDuS. REL. 671 (2000) (finding no gender differences in arbitration outcomes in a
hypothetical case).
260 Josefima M. Rend6n, Under the Justice Radar?: Prejudice in Mediation and
Settlement Negotiations, 30 T. MARSHALL L. REv. 347 (2005) (discussing racial prejudice
in mediation outcomes).
261 POSNER, supra note 124, at 319.
262 Id. at 333.
263 RAWLS, supra note 119, at 62.
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these systems function. We need to have an open and public discussion about
which variety of justice we have chosen to pursue in a particular system.
Moreover, we need to develop ways to generate information to determine
whether the resulting system actually produces the justice for which it is
designed. And, ultimately, we need to teach all of this to every law student.
A. Using Institutional Design to Build Shared Meaning in DSD
We need to build a body of case study research that does for DSD what
Ostrom has done for common pool resources. We need to analyze DSDs
within a shared framework that examines Ostrom's seven categories for
institutional design analysis: 1) participants, 2) their positions, 3) potential
outcomes, 4) allowable actions in relation to outcomes, 5) an individual's
control over this function, 6) the information available to participants in the
DSD, and 7) costs and benefits of various actions and outcomes. 264 We need
to start cataloguing specific structural features of DSDs, and the rules that
create them, using the working list of features provided here and building on
it. We need to assess whether DSDs are robust in Ostrom's sense, and in
particular, to what extent they are characterized by proportional equivalence
between benefits and costs, collective choice arrangements, monitoring,
graduated sanctions, conflict-resolution mechanisms, and minimal
recognition of rights to organize.
B. Transparency in How our DSD Promotes a Variety of Justice
DSD occurs in advisory committees for courts, in facilitated convenings
for environmental conflict resolution, in negotiated consent decrees, in
legislatures and executive branch agencies, in NGOs helping with post-
conflict reconstruction, and in corporate offices for in-house counsel, among
many other settings. We need to develop new ethical precepts for lawyers
who find themselves designing justice. Professor Menkel-Meadow and the
former CPR Institute265 began to address this issue through a commission on
an ethical code for ADR providers. 266 However, individual practitioners find
264 OSTROM, supra note 18, at 32.
265 Now the CPR International Institute for Conflict Prevention and Resolution,
CPR Homepage, http://www.cpradr.org (last visited Feb. 7, 2009).
266 For a description of this work, see Georgetown Law--Georgetown Hewlett
Program in Conflict Resolution and Legal Problem Solving,
http://www.law.georgetown.edu/hewlett/#cpr (last visited Feb. 7, 2009).
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themselves designing justice, and we do not have ethical guidance for them
in this emerging role.
Moreover, we need to determine best practices in DSD. These best
practices should include a conscious, deliberative, and transparent
consideration of the variety or varieties of justice a system is designed to
foster or provide. Instead of having a conversation at the level of
administration of justice and transaction costs, we need to have dialogue
about justice itself.
C. Measuring Varieties of Justice
How is one to measure justice? We need funding for research on the
function of DSDs and transparency. Any effort to examine the overall pattern
of outcomes for purposes of determining distributive justice requires
disclosure of individual cases. One legislative approach has been to mandate
a limited form of disclosure. In 2002, California enacted disclosure
requirements for consumer arbitration information, defined to include both
employment and consumer disputes submitted to arbitration under the
supervision of a private company. 267 Unfortunately, there has been
267 California Code of Civil Procedure § 1281.96 (2005). Section 1281.96
"Publication of Consumer Arbitration Information by Private Arbitration Company"
provides:
(a) Except as provided in paragraph (2) of subdivision (b), any private
arbitration company that administers or is otherwise involved in, a
consumer arbitration, shall collect, publish at least quarterly, and make
available to the public in a computer-searchable format, which shall be
accessible at the Internet Web site of the private arbitration company,
if any, and on paper upon request, all of the following information
regarding each consumer arbitration within the preceding five years:
(1) The name of the nonconsumer party, if the nonconsumer
party is a corporation or other business entity.
(2) The type of dispute involved, including goods, banking,
insurance, health care, employment, and, if it involves
employment, the amount of the employee's annual wage
divided into the following ranges: less than one hundred
thousand dollars ($100,000), one hundred thousand dollars
($100,000) to two hundred fifty thousand dollars ($250,000),
inclusive, and over two hundred fifty thousand dollars
($250,000).
(3) Whether the consumer or nonconsumer party was the
prevailing party.
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incomplete compliance with this provision, although it is not clear whether
this is a function of individual arbitrators failing to supply the requisite
information about their cases or of providers using categories to preserve
confidentiality, which in fact obscure outcomes.268
We cannot measure justice without transparency, at least in a limited
form for researchers bound by a confidentiality agreement. At present, data is
held hostage by the privatization of justice. An alternative approach would be
to create public regulatory forums with the power to ascertain the nature of
the justice that private systems provide. California's disclosure requirements
were intended to forestall this step by empowering the parties to use
information to make their own judgments about justice. However, in the
(4) On how many occasions, if any, the nonconsumer party
has previously been a party in an arbitration or mediation
administered by the private arbitration company.
(5) Whether the consumer party was represented by an
attorney.
(6) The date the private arbitration company received the
demand for arbitration, the date the arbitrator was appointed,
and the date of disposition by the arbitrator or private
arbitration company.
(7) The type of disposition of the dispute, if known,
including withdrawal, abandonment, settlement, award after
hearing, award without hearing, default, or dismissal without
hearing.
(8) The amount of the claim, the amount of the award, and
any other relief granted, if any.
(9) The name of the arbitrator, his or her total fee for the
case, and the percentage of the arbitrator's fee allocated to
each party.
(c) This section shall apply to any consumer arbitration commenced
on or after January 1, 2003.
Id. at (a)-(c).
268 Lisa Blomgren Bingham et al., Arbitration Data Disclosure in California: What
We Have and What We Need, (April 15, 2005) (paper presented at the American Bar
Association Section of Dispute Resolution Conference, Los Angeles, CA, on file with
author). On these disclosures, a researcher cannot examine arbitration award outcomes in
relation to which party, consumer or non-consumer, won the case. This makes it
impossible to form a judgment on macrojustice. It also makes it difficult for the consumer
party to make an informed judgment about the acceptability of individual arbitrators. The
information disclosed is not analogous to the institutional memory of a repeat user of
arbitration services.
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absence of effective disclosure, there may be efforts to find an alternative
mechanism to address the concerns about private justice systems. In order to
make DSDs accountable for the justice they provide, we must make them
more transparent.
D. Building Curriculum to Teach Lawyers how to Design Justice
The trial is vanishing, yet law schools still train new lawyers to assume
the backdrop of their work is primarily a single context: court (civil or
criminal, state or federal, trial or appellate). While clients need lawyers in
court, increasingly they need their lawyers to help manage conflict long
before it gets there. Lawyers work with clients in a wide variety of
institutional or organizational contexts: companies, nongovernmental
organizations, public agencies at the local, regional, state, national, or
transnational levels, and collaborative networks including the public,
nonprofit, and private sectors. Moreover, ideally clients ask for advice when
conflict is still evolving, before it has matured into a dispute with identifiable
parties, and long before it becomes a complaint filed in court or with an
administrative agency.
We need to teach law students that they may ultimately design justice. It
may happen when they find themselves negotiating a supply contract for
which they need a process for resolving future disputes, or advising an
employer on how to put in place an administrative grievance procedure for
sexual harassment claims, or determining how to engage citizens and
stakeholders in the work of a public agency. While a handful of law schools
currently have courses or parts of courses on DSD,269 they are by far the
minority. Moreover, the courses are generally electives that most law
students will never take.
We need a curriculum component that every law student must learn.
How can lawyers better analyze and understand the context in which conflict
arises and their choices helping clients manage that conflict? What are the
strategic advantages and disadvantages posed by different institutions and
systems? In order to design justice, they need the skill set to analyze the
institutional DSD that already exists. Stephanie Smith and Janet Martinez
have proposed a set of diagnostic questions and categories to help
269 These include, but are not necessarily limited to, Harvard Law School, Stanford
Law School, University of California Hastings College of the Law, University of
Missouri Columbia School of Law, Ohio State University Moritz College of Law,
Marquette, Pepperdine, Cardozo and Penn State Dickinson School of Law.
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practitioners analyze DSD. 270 These include: 1) the goals of the designers
and resulting system; 2) the stakeholders and their relative power; 3) the
context within which DSD takes place, specifically how it arose, how the
system was designed and by whom; 4) the structures of the system and
incentives it creates; 5) its transparency and accountability; 6) how the
system is financed; 7) how successful the system is and who participates in
it; and 8) how the system relates to and interacts with the formal legal
system. 271 Each of these diagnostic questions relate to categories of
information in institutional analysis as proposed by Ostrom.
The curriculum should also expose students to case studies illustrating
the breadth of contexts within which DSD occurs. In addition to courts, these
contexts fall within five broad categories: intraorganizational (the
employment context), extraorganizational (person-person; company-
company; hospital-patient; vendor-customer, contracts), international public
institutions (state-state, treaties, and contracts), international private law
(multinational corporations, contracts), and governance or public policy
(dialogue and deliberation in legislative and quasi-legislative settings to
dispute resolution in quasi-judicial ones). Lawyers owe it to their clients to
be skilled in understanding the context within which they are providing
services.
V. CONCLUSION
The organizers of this symposium ask us to look toward the next
generation of dispute system design. The most significant future issues are
these: we must become more mindful of how we affect justice when we
design institutions and systems to manage conflict; we should move more
knowingly and intentionally to research, deliberate on, and assess justice in
DSD; and we owe it to the next generation of lawyers to teach them how to
serve ethically when they design justice.
2 70 Martinez & Smith, supra note 57.
271 Id.
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